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About SIRJ 
Swarthmore International Relations Journal (SIRJ) is an undergraduate journal publishing works 
on global affairs. Established in 2016, SIRJ is student written, edited, and produced. The primary 
goals of SIRJ are twofold: to help foster a new generation of scholars, and to bring fresh, liberal 
arts perspectives to international relations. Through a peer-reviewed editing process, SIRJ seeks 
to become a major vehicle for undergraduate research on international relations, and encourage 
critical and intellectual dialogues among scholars. 
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The election of Donald Trump as president, the UK’s decision to leave the European Union 
(“Brexit”), and the wider rise of populism, have injected enormous uncertainty into the 
international system. Long-standing assumptions, such as the U.S. commitment to NATO and 
other alliances, are increasingly being questioned. Meanwhile, Russian interference in the 2016 
U.S. election suggests that foreign states are seeking to benefit from political polarization in the 
United States. 
 
At such a time, we need insightful and accessible writing on foreign affairs, which is why it is 
such a privilege to introduce the second issue of the Swarthmore International Relations Journal 
or SIRJ. Students write, edit, and produce the journal, working closely with a group of peer 
reviewers. 
 
The journal represents the continuation of a rich tradition of engagement by Swarthmore students 
in international issues, with many alumni of the college working for NGOs, the State 
Department, or the U.S. military. 
 
The five articles in this edition of SIRJ cover a range of topics: Bolivarianism, refugee issues in 
Europe, climate change, drones, and autonomous weapons systems. They are certainly timely, 
given the crisis in Venezuela and the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris 
climate deal. They also speak to each other, most obviously with the two articles on robots, but 
also in the discussion of Washington’s “neo-imperialism” in Latin America and U.S. leadership 
(or lack thereof) on the climate issue. The pieces question accepted wisdom, calling, for 
example, for a paradigm shift in counter-terrorism and a new model for sharing the refugee 
burden. 
 
I am confident that SIRJ will go from strength to strength and become a valuable voice in the 
national debate on these pressing issues. 
 
Dominic Tierney 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
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Editor’s Note 
Thank you for reading the Swarthmore International Relations Journal (SIRJ). This publication 
was founded in  2016, when two members of the class of 2016, Isabel Knight and Andrew 
Taylor, saw a need for a space for undergraduates to have their work peer edited, reviewed, and 
published. This second issue is the product of many thoughtful administrative changes in the 
journal’s structure, of new partnerships, and of many innovative articles by our contributors. We 
have partnered with the Swarthmore College Libraries to publish and archive our works online. 
We have implemented a blind-review process to ensure quality of our articles, and have turned to 
faculty, staff, and alumni with experience in academic publishing to hone our processes. I hope 
that this year we have laid the groundwork for SIRJ to become a lasting presence on Swarthmore 
campus and in the broader scholarly community.  
In this issue you will find articles that look toward the future of international relations.  One 
essay synthesizes historical events with the modern, examining the continued importance of 
Simón Bolivar in 21st century Latin American politics. We include articles focusing on the ever 
present refugee resettlement crisis in the European Union and on environmental policies in the 
context of U.S. hegemonic decline. Following articles address modern warfare, expansions in the 
U.S. drone program under Barack Obama, and artificial intelligence in lethal autonomous 
weapons systems (LAWS). Our authors have worked hard to refine their arguments and policy 
recommendations and have produced a diverse and forward-looking issue.  
Finally, I want to thank Dr. Katie Price and Professor Ben Berger at the Lang Center for Civic 
and Social Responsibility for their patience and continued faith in the 2016-2017 SIRJ student 
team. I also want to thank Nagyon Kim and Sally Wang for their tireless and enthusiastic help in 
the last stages of the editing and formatting process. I also want to thank Maria Aghazarian, 
Professor Emily Paddon Rhodes, George Yin, and Lindsay Dolan for their guidance and advice 
from this issue’s earliest stages to these last few weeks before publication. Without your help, 
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Confronting (Neo)Imperialism: The Resurgence of Bolivarianism 
Chelsea Richardson 
Haverford College 
I. Introduction: Simón Bolívar, The Liberator 
Simón Bolívar serves as a perennial icon in Latin American history and culture, having 
fought wars to liberate multiple nation-states from the grip of imperialism and provided the 
theoretical frameworks for the institutional design of multiple Latin American republics. After 
Spain lost its sovereignty over the newly independent states in Latin America, there was an 
immediate need for governance, order, and identity. Bolívar, a Spanish Creole, traveled to 
Spanish America and determined that the new nation-states ought to be republics, freed from 
the colonial institutions that Spain had left behind. Known as “The Liberator,” he served as 
president of Peru, Bolivia, Gran Colombia, and Venezuela. His ambitious visions for large, 
unified political entities1 in Latin America led to the establishment of Gran Colombia, which 
later dissolved into five separate states.  
Bolívar’s calls for political unity and rejection of colonial Spanish institutions have not 
disappeared from political discourse in Latin America. In fact, toward the end of the twentieth 
century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, then-president of Venezuela Hugo Chávez 
adopted Bolívar’s calls for Latin American nationalism and unity, and formulated his own 
project to forge unity between Central and Latin American states. He founded the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Americas2 (ALBA) in 2004, along with the late Cuban president, Fidel Castro. 
The question remains: why have Bolívar’s ideas for Latin American integration persisted for so 
long, and why did Hugo Chávez revive them in the form of ALBA at the dawn of the twenty-
first century? Surprisingly, little theoretical research or literature exists on the topic of ALBA, 
Venezuelan foreign policy, or Chávez’s Neo-Bolivarianism (Williams 2011, 259). This paper 
explores these topics for their significance to the fields of international politics and comparative 
political theory, as well as the bridge between the two. ALBA has also served as a potential 
model of South-South cooperation and socialist economic integration. Furthermore, the 
resurgence of Bolívar’s ideas raises the question of how political theory from the past can inform 
policies of the present. This paper will address the reasons Hugo Chávez brought Simón Bolívar 
into the twenty-first century, and the implications of doing so. Ultimately, Simón Bolívar had 
believed that political unity would propel Latin American states to economic and cultural 
independence  
1 When I speak of Bolívar’s calls for political unity, I am referring to the political union of 
multiple preexisting nation-states, not the internal unity of a single nation state.  
2 In Spanish, it is called Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América. It was 
formerly called the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, but it was changed to Alliance in 
2009.  
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from Spain. His theories have now resurged with Hugo Chávez’s Neo-Bolivarianism, in order to 
protect Central America’s independence from the cultural, economic, and political hegemony of 
the United States, the neo-imperial power of the twenty-first century. 
 
II. Bolívar’s Call for Political Unity and Destruction of Spanish Colonial Legacies 
 Throughout his political writings, Bolívar has emphasized the need for political 
integration of Latin American states. While he did not believe that the entire continent should be 
integrated into one state—an idea he referred to as “both grandiose and impractical”—he did 
believe that neighboring states should unite to create more powerful and independent republics 
(Bolívar 2003, 26, 27). This vision was actualized through the creation of Gran Colombia in 
1821, which existed as a unified state until internal divisions eventually caused its dissolution 
into separate republics in 1831. During its existence, Gran Colombia encompassed land that is 
now modern-day Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador, as well as parts of Guyana, Peru, 
and Brazil. Bolívar had believed strongly that integration was the best hope for a prosperous 
nation-state, ambitiously asserting, “undoubtedly, unity is what we need to complete our project 
of regeneration” (Bolívar 2003, 29). He acknowledged that divisions had persisted among the 
Latin American nations, for this is “the nature of civil wars” (Bolívar 2003, 29). He also 
understood that ideological divisions between “conservatives and reformers” and the constant 
threat of civil war could divide these new, fragile states at any time (Bolívar 2003, 29). Thus, 
remaining realistic, he wrote that unity will only come “through sensible action and well-
organized effort” (2003, 29). This organized action failed during his time, but appeared to be 
more promising under the leadership of Venezuela, as this paper will discuss later. In sum, 
Bolívar believed that integration of Latin American states was the best plan for the region’s 
stability and good governance.  
 Bolívar also emphasized the need to expunge the institutional legacies of Spanish 
colonial rule, which he believed could be done best through political unification. In The Jamaica 
Letter, Bolívar warns: “we are dominated by the vices contracted under the rule of a nation like 
Spain, which has shown itself to excel only in pride, ambition, vengeance, and greed” (2003, 23). 
He was contemptuous of Spain and its cultural legacies, and had wished to reinvent an American 
culture without Spanish trace. Furthermore, he believed that the institutions left behind by 
colonial Spain, such as slavery and mercantilism, were detrimental to the development of 
democratic republics. At the time, Spain’s economy had run based on the system of mercantilism 
and was commandeered by a monarchy. Furthermore, Spanish colonizers introduced slavery into 
the Americas. Bolívar claimed that each of these Spanish institutions made Latin America less 
amenable to capitalism, self-governance, and republicanism, lamenting the lack of “political 
skills and virtues that distinguish our brothers to the north,” referring to the United States, which 
had been a newly formed republic at the time (2003, 23). Bolívar felt that Spanish hegemony and 
colonial institutions had socialized Americans to not desire the republican values of self-
governance and individual liberty. For these reasons, Bolívar informs “exactly what we need to 
 
 
  Page 7 
Swarthmore International Relations Journal Spring 2017
ready ourselves to expel the Spaniards and form a free government: unity” (2003, 29). In short, 
Bolívar had sought to protect Latin America from what he considered damaging colonial 
remnants, through establishing strong, unified, republican states.  
III. Republican Imperialism as a Solution to Spanish Hegemony
The tension between Latin America and Spanish institutions, ideologies, and culture 
forced America to engage in a rather contradictory power struggle that Joshua Simon refers to as 
republican imperialism (2012, 280). In his political projects and war efforts, Bolívar engaged in 
republican imperialism, which involved “a renewed imperial project as a means of overcoming 
the legacies of Spanish rule and consolidating American independence” (Simon 2012, 282, 283). 
Paradoxically, in order to avoid reconquest, post-colonial states sometimes employed 
imperialistic methods of governance to consolidate their power. To maintain control of the newly 
established republics and uphold their independence from the daunting Spanish Empire, Bolívar 
employed more authoritarian methods of governance, such as his establishment of a presidency 
with concentrated power and lifetime appointment. Bolívar fought imperialism and protected 
republicanism by engaging in imperialistic governance, essentially forcing the residents of the 
newly formed republics to be free. His imperialism also involved annexing regions into his 
integrated states through military force, based on the idea that a larger, unified state was more 
capable of defending itself from reconquest (Simon 2012, 294). Bolívar’s political writings are 
haunted by the paradox of republican imperialism: the inhabitants of Latin America are too 
beholden to Spanish hegemony to recognize the benefits of republicanism, and thus, they must 
be forced to acquire the freedoms that Bolívar deems necessary for citizens of an independent 
republic. Bolívar was fighting “the reflexive loyalism of people long denied the right to rule 
themselves” (Simon 2012, 284). According to Bolívar, the newly freed states must embrace 
elements of imperialism to prevent reconquest by the Spanish Empire and consolidate republican 
institutions.  
This paradox also reveals the driving urgency behind Bolívar’s philosophies: the need to 
solidify and integrate independent states that could defend themselves against the empires of the 
world, including Spain. Justifying his call for political unity, he draws on the specter of “a Spain 
that wields more machinery for war than anything we can amass in secret” (Bolívar 2003, 29). In 
a sense, political unity is a system of defense against the militarily formidable nations throughout 
the world. In some ways, this resembles the “soft balancing” approach taken in contemporary 
international politics (Williams 2011). Nations engage in soft balancing by employing “non-
military tools to protect their interests, and to delay, frustrate, and undermine a hegemonic state’s 
capacity to impose its preferences” (Williams 2011, 261). In Bolívar’s time, creating a large, 
politically unified state could set up a Latin American republic to experience economic growth 
and a more strategic geopolitical positioning. Five small states cannot negotiate on the world 
stage, but one large state can engage in this style of “power politics” (Williams 2011, 261).  
As such, Bolívar’s call for unity served as a means to counteract the cultural hegemony, 
ideologies, colonial institutions, and political power of the Spanish empire. His emphasis on the 
strength of the Spanish military, and the weakness of smaller individual states demonstrates that  
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his call for unity was primarily intended to protect against Spanish encroachment, and expel the 
legacies of colonization. Though there may have been some internal benefits to political 
unification, Bolívar’s priority was defense against external powers and strategic positioning in 
international affairs. 
 
IV. Chávez Confronts a Neo-Imperial Power3 
  Classical Bolivarianism, or the philosophies of Bolívar himself, arose out of the need to 
counteract a formidable empire and its legacies. In the times of Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro, 
Neo-Bolivarianism has arisen as a response to a neo-imperial, unipolar world power: the United 
States. Because the U.S. possesses a military stronger than any other in the world, Latin 
American states have benefitted from its protection. However, the U.S. stipulates many 
conditions for that protection, which range from participation in its war on drugs to free trade 
agreements. The cultural, political, and economic hegemony of the U.S. positions itself as the 
neo-imperial, unipolar power presiding over Latin America, guaranteeing it the right to intervene 
on behalf of its own interests for its role in protecting the region as a whole. 
  To begin with, the current historical moment can be accurately characterized as a 
unipolar world order. The most recent example of a non-unipolar moment in history is  
the Cold War era, in which the Soviet Union and its satellite states counterbalanced the power of 
the United States and its allies in a bipolar world. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
United States emerged as the unipolar world power, a towering hegemon that no other nation 
could counterbalance against. Scholars of international relations generally agree with this 
characterization, arguing that a combination of the U.S.’s cultural hegemony, political dominion, 
and military prowess situates it as the obvious unipolar world power (Posen 2003; Mowle and 
Sacko 2007; Ikenberry 1998). The U.S.’s behavior on the international stage confirms Mowle 
and Sacko’s hypotheses predicting the behavior of unipolar powers. Mowle and Sacko predict 
that while non-unipolar powers abide by the statutes, conventions, and norms of international 
law and institutions, unipolar powers often reject these constraints as they see fit (2007, 101). 
The U.S. has a prolific history of conducting military interventions around the world that violate 
international treaties, laws, and norms. For instance, scholars of international law consider the 
NATO bombing of Serbian forces in 1999, the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan (Posen 2003, 
12), airstrikes in undeclared war zones, and many other actions of the United States violations 
and war crimes. The United States is not a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
even though 124 states, including the majority of the U.S.’s allies and trade partners, are  
 
                                                
3 For more detailed accounts of the historical events in this section, see Slatta, “Time Line of US-
Latin American Relations”; Petras, “U.S. Offensive”; Vanderbush, “Good Neighbor 
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registered as member states. The U.S. continues its unconventional and likely illegal drone war 
in nations it is not at war with, at times killing its own citizens without due process, in violation 
of international treaties (Scahill 2016). In short, the U.S. does as it pleases and faces very few 
consequences for its actions. While actors from the Global South (such as Joseph Kony of 
Uganda and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya) have been prosecuted by the ICC, U.S. actors have 
never been held accountable by the ICC or any comparable institution. Furthermore, the U.S.’s 
military dominance provides it “command of the global commons” (Posen 2003, 8). It maintains 
command of the seas, conflict zones, space, and air (Posen 2003). The U.S.’s command of the 
commons manifests physically in the form of its Unified Command Plan, with bases throughout 
the world prepared for military action at any moment (Posen 2003, 18). With the ability to 
physically defeat any other existing power on the world stage, the U.S. is able to maintain 
unipolar power while exploiting its political, cultural, and economic hegemony over the world 
(Posen 2003, 8-9). According to its behavior in the realm of international law and its military 
prowess, the U.S. acts as a unipolar world power at this historical moment. 
In addition to its status as the unipolar world power, the U.S. has developed into a neo-
imperial power in Latin America. Some elements of U.S. hegemony in Latin America are 
imperialistic in the traditional sense of the word, meaning that the U.S. has political sovereignty 
over some Latin American territory. The U.S. primed itself for interventionism in Latin America 
with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, but truly began taking over the imperial legacy of Spain 
during the Spanish-American War of 1898 (Kryzanek 1996, 28-41). In this war, Spain lost 
sovereignty over its last remaining colonies: Cuba, the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico 
(Kryzanek 1996, 39-41). Cuba gained independence, but was required to agree to a set of 
conditions in the controversial Platt Amendment that institutionalized the power imbalance 
between the new state and the U.S. Simultaneously, the United States inserted itself as the new 
sovereign entity for the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico (Kryzanek 1996, 39-41). Today, the 
U.S. retains its sovereignty over Guam and Puerto Rico, further indicating that the U.S. replaced 
Spain as colonizer of the Americas. The U.S.’s political sovereignty over these colonies 
demonstrates its political imperialism, but for the rest of Latin America, the U.S.’s 
encroachments in the region take the form of cultural and economic hegemony as well as 
military interventions against threats to its domination in the region, all of which constitute neo-
imperialism. 
The foreign policies of Theodore Roosevelt provide ample evidence of the U.S.’s 
burgeoning neo-imperialistic exploitation of Latin America in the early twentieth century. In a 
letter to his son regarding the U.S.’s involvement in the Dominican Republic, T. Roosevelt 
laments that it seems “inevitable that the United States should assume an attitude of protection 
and regulation in regard to all these little states in the neighborhood of the Caribbean” (1994, 
308). Since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the U.S. has been poised to take an 
attitude of protection and regulation toward Latin America. In return for the protection of Latin 
American states, the U.S. expects full compliance with its ideological, economic, and military 
agendas. This attitude has manifested itself in various acts of neo-imperialistic intervention, 
particularly during T. Roosevelt’s presidency. José Ingenieros, an Argentine scholar and anti- 
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imperialism activist, speaks out against this neo-imperialist effect of U.S. protection in the 
region, noting during a speech in 1922 that, “the famous Monroe Doctrine, which for a century 
seemed to be the guarantee of our political independence against the threat of European 
conquests, has gradually proved to be a declaration of the American right to protect us and 
intervene in our affairs” (1994, 310). Following the declaration of the Roosevelt Corollary in 
1904, the U.S. intervened militarily in Honduras (1905), Cuba (1906-09), Nicaragua (1912-25), 
Mexico (1914), Haiti (1915-34), the Dominican Republic (1916-24), and Panama (1918) 
(Kryzanek 1996, 44-59; Slatta). The U.S. also supported a coup d’état and regime change in 
Guatemala from 1920-21 (Slatta).  
Despite Franklin D. Roosevelt’s implementation of the “Good Neighbor Policy” in 1933, 
which was intended to be a move away from interventionism, military presence and interventions 
continued in the region (Kryzanek 1996, 59-62). U.S. support and instigation of regime changes 
and coups continued throughout the century, especially with the beginning of the Cold War 
(Kryzanek 1996, 62-65). During the Red Scare, the U.S. was determined to prevent Latin 
American states from becoming satellites of the Soviet Union (USSR) or sparking communist 
revolutions of their own (Kryzanek 1996, 62-65). As such, the U.S. intervened against any 
regime or movement it deemed threatening to its ideological dominance (in the form of capitalist 
hegemony) in the region. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ousted Jacobo Arbenz in 
Guatemala (1954) and Salvador Allende in Chile (1973) due to their ideological linkages to 
socialism, despite the fact that both were democratically elected to their respective roles of 
leadership (Kryzanek 1996, 62-65; Slatta). The U.S. also supported multiple dictators in the 
region, including the Somozas in Nicaragua, the Duvaliers in Haiti, and Fulgencio Bastista in 
Cuba (Kryzanek 1996, 67-81, 102; Slatta). This is not an exhaustive look at U.S. military 
interventions in Latin America, but it demonstrates the degree to which the U.S. intervenes 
against threatening regimes and protects its ideological and economic interests, even when it 
means ousting democratic rulers and supporting dictatorships. In sum, throughout the early- and 
mid-twentieth century, the U.S. demonstrated its commitment to neo-imperialistic interventions 
against any threat to its interests in Latin America. 
Though various presidents in the latter half of the twentieth century attempted to reform 
U.S. interventionism in Latin America, U.S. neo-imperialism reproduced itself with tactics old 
and new. During the Iran-Contra Scandal, the U.S. supported forces fighting against the 
Sandinista government—an example of its continued military intervention in the region 
(Kryzanek 1996, 91-104). Though the U.S. continued with these military tactics, it also 
employed new forms of hegemonic dominance, particularly in pressuring Latin American states 
to participate in free trade agreements that set up asymmetrical advantages for the U.S. and 
fostered an economic dependency of Latin American states (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Cardoso 
and Faletto note that free trade among underdeveloped economies (the majority of Latin 
American states) and developed economies (such as the U.S.) “requires a definite structure of 
relations of domination to assure an international trade based on merchandise produced at 
unequal levels of technology and cost of labor force” (1979, 17). A concept known as import-
substitution, dependent Latin American nations export raw products and import expensive  
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manufactured goods from developed economies, to the benefit of the latter (Cardoso and Faletto 
1979). This paper will expand on the impact of neoliberal trade policies in the next section, but 
in regards to neo-imperialism, the dependency of Latin American nations on the U.S. for imports 
of manufactured goods and advanced technology has positioned the U.S. as economically 
dominant, and Latin American states as economically dependent. The U.S.’s use of free market 
trade policies demonstrates its use of economic tactics in neo-imperialism. 
U.S. military intervention is not a thing of the past; the U.S. continues to instigate coups 
against regimes it perceives as threatening and has pressured Latin American states into 
participating in its so-called “war on drugs.” The U.S. has been especially concerned with the 
regimes of Cuba and Venezuela, who oppose the U.S.’s neoliberal trade agenda and propose 
alternatives such as ALBA. It has been alleged that the U.S. was involved in the attempted coup 
d’état to oust Hugo Chávez in 2002 (Petras 2002, 19). Regardless of whether the U.S. was 
directly involved, it certainly would have supported a regime change in Venezuela, since Chávez 
has repeatedly spoken out against what he refers to as the U.S.’s imperialism (Petras 2002, 19). 
Furthermore, the U.S. has used its war on drugs as a means to intervene in the political affairs of 
various Latin American nations (Petras 2002, 16, 17). The U.S. utilized its “anti-narcotics 
campaign” to enter Colombia and work against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), likely because FARC was “the most powerful anti-imperialist formation contending for 
state power” in Latin America (Petras 2002, 16, 17). Whether through the auspices of the war on 
drugs or covert CIA operations, the U.S. has continuously intervened in Latin America to oust 
and/or neutralize perceived threats to its dominance. This pattern is especially clear in that most 
of the targets of U.S. intervention have been outspoken against what they refer to as U.S. 
imperialism and the imposition of neoliberalism (Petras 2002).  
The U.S.’s neo-imperialism parallels the imperialism of Spain in that both empires 
simultaneously protect and exploit their dependent states. Because the U.S. and Spain protect(ed) 
their dependent states with their vast military resources, they intervene in the affairs of those 
states under the presumption that they have an unlimited right to do so. And because Latin 
American states are or have been dependent on these empires politically, culturally, 
economically, and militarily, they are trapped by their dependencies and are often coerced into 
submission to the demands and interventions of the empire. The only way to escape this duality 
of protection and intervention is to forge independence and expunge the legacies of dependence 
on (neo)imperial powers, so that these states can protect themselves on the world stage. 
V. Neo-Bolivarianism as a Method of Counterbalancing U.S. Hegemony 
As previously stated, Bolívar called for unity to counteract Spanish hegemony. In the 
same way, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the ideologies, cultural hegemony, and 
imperialism of the United States inspired the rise of Neo-Bolivarianism. Hugo Chávez and Fidel 
Castro, both of whom were vociferously anti-U.S. political figures, recognized the danger of 
allowing the U.S.’s power over Latin America to continue growing unhindered. For this reason, 
Chávez developed a plan to revive Bolívar’s vision of a unified Latin American polity of 
multiple states and used it to defend against the United States, a country Chávez considered a  
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(neo)imperial power. H. Michael Erisman refers to Chávez’s revival of Bolívar’s theories as 
“Neo-Bolivarianism,” a term this paper also uses to refer to Chávez’s political ideologies and 
projects based on the writings of Bolívar (2011, 235). Moreover, Erisman characterizes the 
political goals of Neo-Bolivarianism as “mobilizing the hemisphere into a left-wing front against 
what Havana [and Caracas] sees as Washington’s ongoing hegemonic pretensions” (2011, 252). 
Most notably, these projects include the aforementioned ALBA. Chávez, as president of 
Venezuela, announced his plans for ALBA as a revival of Bolívar’s vision of a unified Latin 
American state in 2001 at a conference of Caribbean states (Hirst 2016, n.p.). Chávez then 
officially founded ALBA along with Cuba, under the leadership of Fidel Castro, in 2004. 
Venezuela and Cuba intended ALBA to foster economic cooperation between Central American 
states, provide legitimacy to socialism in those states, and, ultimately, counteract various 
ideological and cultural encroachments of the United States. Today, ALBA’s eight member 
states include Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, Antigua & Barbuda, Ecuador, 
and St. Vincent & the Grenadines (Hirst 2016, n.p.). Its three observer nations include Haiti, 
Iran, and Syria (Hirst 2016, n.p.). Chávez’s project of Central American political integration 
resembles that of Simón Bolívar in a number of ways, particularly because both figures utilized 
political unity as a defense against an imperial power. 
 ALBA counteracts the U.S.’s imperialism through soft balancing, the tactic of 
international politics mentioned earlier in relation to Bolívar’s plans to defend against the 
Spanish empire. The ultimate objective of soft balancing “is to protect the interests of the weak 
against the strong or the potentially threatening,” which in this case are the threatening 
interventions of the neo-imperial U.S. (Williams 2011, 262). Both Bolívar and Chávez aimed to 
protect the interests of weak Latin American states from the encroachments and remnants of 
(neo)imperial nations. For instance, ALBA proposes an alternative to the U.S.-driven ideology of 
neoliberal economics. The U.S. has attempted to implement free trade agreements such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in Mexico and the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) in the rest of the Americas, while ALBA proposes an alternative based on 
cooperation rather than competition. These U.S.-supported neoliberal trade policies are 
detrimental to Latin American political and economic growth because of the unequal terms 
inherent to them (Yaffe 2011, 129). Similarly to Cardoso and Faletto’s analysis of dependency in 
Latin America, Helen Yaffe illuminates the “comparative advantage…under which capitalist 
countries, the first to industrialize, should export high value added products and services to 
‘developing countries’, which provide the low value added raw materials and agricultural 
products needed for the industrialized world” (2011, 129). Ultimately, this model of neoliberal 
trade “perpetuates underdevelopment” in Latin America (Yaffe 2011, 129). Some scholars 
contend this characterization, arguing that free trade agreements are generally beneficial to the 
economic development of the region; nonetheless, the U.S.’s imposition of these trade policies 
through the so-called “Washington Consensus” limits the self-determination of political actors 
within the region, some of whom prefer cooperative rather than competitive economic models.  
So, rather than engage in a competitive arrangement rigged in favor of highly 
industrialized nations like the United States, ALBA proposes cooperative exchanges between 
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ideologically similar and more equally industrialized neighboring nations. These exchanges are 
then based on improvement of the quality of life, rather than increase of profits, in accordance 
with the socialist ideologies held by Chávez and Castro (Yaffe 2011, 132). The most significant 
way that ALBA’s alternative to neoliberalism challenges U.S. economic hegemony is by simply 
offering another choice. Because dependent Latin American states do not have the advanced 
technology required to manufacture their own goods, they have the “false choice” between 
depending on the U.S. through free trade agreements or struggling to provide for themselves 
without the means to do so (Castañeda 1992, 674). ALBA provides an alternative option and 
thus undermines the U.S.’s ability to coerce Latin American states into free trade agreements, as 
participation in these agreements is no longer the only practical option. In this case, ALBA’s soft 
balancing prevents the U.S. from unilaterally exploiting the underdevelopment of Latin 
American nations through neoliberal trade agreements. 
Furthermore, ALBA proposes soft balancing strategies to counteract the cultural 
hegemony of the United States. As part of ALBA, Venezuela created Telesur, a television 
network meant to compete with U.S.-based networks like CNN (Williams 2011, 267). This 
Spanish language broadcast is designed to “promote a multipolar international order to balance 
U.S. hegemony” and “to balance Washington’s soft power in telecommunications and, 
potentially, limit the economic benefits it derives from broadcasts to Latin America” (Williams 
2011, 268). Because CNN and CNN Español are headquartered in the U.S., they present political 
events in a manner biased towards the interests of the U.S. and often against anti-U.S. figures 
such as Chávez (Williams 2011, 268). Telesur allows these Central American states to frame 
world events in their own context, rather than relying on the interpretive lens of the United States 
as the only source of information. Similar to how ALBA provides an alternate economic option 
where there was previously only one, Telesur provides an alternate option for 
telecommunications where previously CNN and other U.S.-based media conglomerates were 
some of the only stations being broadcast. This interrupts the U.S.’s hegemonic control over 
communication and information, which is a powerful mechanism in checking U.S.’s cultural 
imperialism over Latin America.  
Altogether, the Neo-Bolivarian initiatives and programs of ALBA present various soft 
balancing tactics to counteract the hegemonic, imperialistic encroachments of the United States. 
They provide alternatives to the neo-imperialistic agendas of the U.S., and, through the power of 
choice, undermine the U.S.’s dominance over the region. 
 
VI. The Potential for South-South Cooperation and a Multi-Polar World Order 
 When envisioning political unity in Latin America, Bolívar imagined “our brothers to the 
north” who have, since his time, prospered economically, culturally, and politically (2003, 23). 
He understood that political unity, as the United States had achieved early on, could lead to this 
kind of prosperity. Joshua Simon explores the “American development gap” and its institutional 
roots in his article, “The Americas’ More Perfect Unions” (2014, 818). He emphasizes the 
“effects of institutions” on “economic investment, exchange, and growth” and ultimately 
concludes that “political unity is, in and of itself, an institutional impetus for economic growth” 
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 (Simon 2014, 810, 812). He verifies Bolívar’s original claims that rejecting colonial 
Spanishinstitutions was key to developing a new polity and set of institutions that would be 
conducive to the development of industrialization and economic prosperity. Specifically, “ALBA 
could foster cooperation, rather than competition, amongst member states, allowing Latin 
Americans to realize gains from specialization and trade between regions with complementary 
comparative advantages, while also pursuing reforms aimed at sustained growth by reducing 
entrenched inequalities and diversifying domestic industries” (Simon 2014, 822). Chávez seems 
to have understood the truth to Bolívar’s call for establishing the institutional means for 
economic growth: political unity—even when the mechanism to achieve it involves force. 
Political unity in the form of ALBA also serves as a model of South-South Cooperation 
and how such cooperation could potentially offset the unipolar power of the United States. As 
mentioned earlier, Neo-Bolivarianism arose as a result of the U.S.’s new position as the unipolar 
world power. South-South Cooperation through ALBA offers a pathway toward a multi-polar 
world order in which a unified polity of Central American states can engage in international 
politics and negotiation with power comparable to that of the United States. One of the goals of 
ALBA is to bring about a multi-polar world order and significantly decrease the political, 
economic, and cultural hegemony of the United States. But, in order to quarrel with the United 
States, Chávez must embrace some of its most imperialistic aspects for his own endeavors. Thus, 
we come full circle to the republican imperialism used by Bolívar to forcibly unify various Latin 
American states. To defend against a (neo)imperial power, a state must utilize imperialism for its 
own protection. Just as Bolívar is often criticized for authoritarianism and militarism, Chávez is 
accused of humanitarian abuses, “imperial ambitions,” and restrictions of freedom (Hirst 2016, 
n.p.). In fact, ALBA could be seen as an imperial project in and of itself. A way Chávez’s
republican imperialism mirrors that of Bolívar is Chávez’s use of oil to entice (or coerce) other 
states into joining ALBA (Ellner 2007). If these states want to benefit from the “preferential 
treatment for Southern nations” promised by ALBA, they must enter a union that requires 
various ideological commitments in return (Ellner 2007, 16). So, was Chávez really trying to 
foster cooperation among his neighboring states, or was he maneuvering to extend his political 
power farther across Latin America? Was he simply trying to develop Venezuela’s economy by 
exporting oil to neighboring nations? Was Bolívar truly trying to protect the interests of Latin 
American republicanism, or was he simply trying to expand the jurisdiction of his presidency? In 
their attempts to counteract the influence of (neo)imperial powers, Chávez and Bolívar both 
embarked on imperialist projects of their own. Nonetheless, they can both be said to have made 
considerable progress in protecting their interests.  
VII. Conclusion: Propagandistic Icon or Source of Political Theory?
Critics of Neo-Bolivarianism may argue that Chávez is merely using the iconography of 
Bolívar as a historic hero to mobilize the people and propagandize his political endeavors, 
whereas in actuality he does not care for Bolívar’s ideas. In Hugo Chávez: The Transformation 
from Democracy to a Mafia State, Ari Chaplin contends that Chávez uses the legendary 
symbolism of Bolívar as a means to legitimate his authoritarian rule (2014, 2). He further argues  
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that Bolívar’s thought is not applicable to the twenty-first century, because it “has little to do 
with the requirements of the twenty-first century in fields such as education, science, technology, 
productivity, and globalization” (Chaplin 2014, 2). He invokes various dictatorships and 
authoritarian regimes of the past that have also used Bolívar or similarly legendary icons to 
legitimize their regimes. He even refers to the member-states of ALBA as “satellites of the 
Chávez regime,” invoking a comparison between Venezuela and the Soviet Empire (18). 
Ultimately, he argues that there is no modern-day use for Bolívar’s ideas, and that the only 
possible reason for his invocation is to manipulate the Venezuelan people and gain power.  
On the other hand, ALBA’s programs have achieved a considerable degree of success 
since its inception. For instance, under ALBA, Cuba provided “total scholarships for the training 
of 10,000 Venezuelan doctors and nurses” (Erisman 2011, 242). This helped to counterbalance 
the “brain drain” Cuba experienced as a result of generous and flexible immigration and asylum 
policies the U.S. extended to Cubans. Cuba and Venezuela have also agreed on various 
preferential trade and work arrangements, such as the exchange of doctors between the two 
nations, the creation of “some 100,000 jobs in Venezuela,” and preferential tariffs for Cuba 
(Erisman 2011, 242). Furthermore, ALBA established a central bank able to provide loans to 
debt-ridden nations such as Nicaragua, which was boycotted by the International Monetary Fund 
(Yaffe 2011, 137). The implementation and success of these ALBA programs serve as a 
counterpoint to Chaplin’s arguments. If Chávez only intended to utilize the iconography of 
Bolívar to rise to power and gain popularity, he would not have made the effort to implement 
Bolívar’s ideas in the form of tangible, beneficial programs. The efficacy and scale of these 
programs require further assessment, but from the proliferation of programming, it is clear that 
ALBA is more than just rhetoric. Nonetheless, the future of ALBA is uncertain, with shifting 
relations between the U.S. and Cuba following the removal of the trade embargo, and the new 
regimes of Raúl Castro and Nicolás Maduro. If U.S.-Cuba relations continue to normalize, the 
benefits of a political alliance meant to counter the influence of the United States may dwindle 
for the younger Castro. Without this significant player in ALBA, the alliance could falter.  
As Simon questions, “What can policymakers of the present learn from the political 
thinkers of the past?” (2014, 821). Further research into ALBA and Central American foreign 
policy could illuminate the potential efficacy of such integrationist projects in establishing 
political power and cultivating economic growth. In the process, scholars could also look into 
various other post-colonial thinkers from the times of Bolívar, and evaluate the situational factors 
that have caused certain ideas to diminish and others to resurge in projects like ALBA. In sum, 
there is considerable room for research into the intersection between Central American 
international politics and the history of Latin American political thought. Under what conditions 
can we continue to formulate effective policies and programs in the present day on the basis of 
political theories set forward centuries ago? And what can the resurgence of certain political 
ideas tell us about the current historical moment? 
A unipolar world order such as our current international system is more predictable than a 
multipolar world order, where multiplicity of ideas and experimentation with methods 
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of governance can generate a variety among political bodies, economic systems, and cultural 
endeavors. With the U.S. as liberal hegemon, capitalism seems to be the only truly viable 
economic system. However, under a multipolar world order similar to what ALBA seeks to 
create, alternative economic systems grounded in cooperation rather than competition could be 
viable. In some ways, though, this lack of predictability could generate instability. In a 
multipolar world order, world superpowers might continue to war with one another, as they did 
in the First and Second World Wars. In a unipolar world order, the unipolar power wars 
primarily with weaker states and non-state actors, as seen in airstrikes throughout the Middle 
East, the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the global war on terror. A multipolar world 
order might bring with it variety and choice, but will it also bring with it instability and 
destruction?  
Overall, this paper contends that Bolívar’s insights and calls for political unity have 
persisted into the present day because he understood the necessary institutional mechanisms for 
competing with (neo)imperial power. Political unity, combined with a paradoxical but necessary 
republican imperialism, allows for economic growth and the soft balancing tactics of ALBA. 
These tactics allow weaker states to align, in the sense of South-South Cooperation, and present 
themselves as worthy opponents to the existing hegemonic powers. Ultimately, Bolívar 
presented his ideas at a time when it was necessary to relinquish ties with the colonial empire of 
Spain, and Chávez revived Bolívar’s visions at a time when it was necessary to interrupt the neo-
imperialistic hegemony of the new unipolar world power, the United States. 
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Refugee Resettlement in Crisis:  
The Failure of the EU-Turkey Deal and the Case for Burden-Sharing 
Michelle McEwen 
Swarthmore College 
At this moment in history, the scale of forced migration has reached unprecedented 
levels. Due to the increase in civil wars and repressive regimes, the global population of people 
forcibly displaced from their homes has grown from 33.9 million in 1997 to 65.6 million in 
2016, a record high (UNHCR 2016, 5). The current crisis in Syria has dramatically added to the 
number of forced migrants in recent years and has brought the “refugee1 crisis” center stage as 
one of the most urgent international concerns today. While many have discussed international 
attempts to address the structural causes of forced migration, those causes are unlikely to be 
resolved soon. The refugee crisis is a long-term trend rather than a temporary phenomenon, 
because the number of chronically fragile states is growing, while opportunities for mobility are 
increasing (Betts 2015). Therefore, it is imperative to address the consequence of those structural 
problems—the millions displaced and in need of protection.  
This paper will zero in on one demonstrative example of the current international policy 
response to refugee protection in Europe—the recent EU-Turkey deal and its shortcomings as a 
solution to the crisis. While the deal is successful at reducing the number of  irregular arrivals to 
the EU, it fails at its legal and ethical obligation to protect refugees. The deal fails to protect 
because its underlying objective is not protection, but rather border control via “burden-shifting,” 
the transferring of responsibility onto other states. By outsourcing the refugee crisis to Turkey 
and forcing Greece to deal with refugees alone as the rest of the EU closes their borders, 
protection has deteriorated. As a result of the deal, refugees are crowded into under-resourced 
detention centers with unsafe conditions. In addition, the deal could hurt the European economy 
and threaten international security. 
This paper will examine: (1) the terms of the EU-Turkey deal, (2) the humanitarian, 
economic, and global security consequences of its burden-shifting approach, (3) and the flawed 
legal framework, national interests, and short-sighted conceptualization of the crisis that beget 
burden-shifting. Finally, this paper will propose tradable refugee quotas with a matching 
mechanism as a possible policy solution for the EU sharing its responsibility to protect refugees. 
1 The term “refugee” is used broadly to refer to a person forcibly displaced from their home 
country seeking protection from a range of causes such as authoritarian regimes, conflict, human 
rights violations, environmental disasters, and state collapse. 
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The EU-Turkey Deal 
The EU-Turkey deal targets the flow of asylum-seekers traveling from Turkey to Europe 
through Greece. According to the European Commission, “in 2015 alone, more than one million 
people arrived in the EU, around 885,000 of them through Greece” (EC 2017, 1).  
Many asylum-seekers risk their lives crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece in order to 
claim asylum in the EU. For instance, in December 2015 over 5,000 people made this journey 
each day (EC 2017, 2). The journey is dangerous; 1,145 asylum-seekers died in the Aegean in 
2015 (EC 2017, 2). Once in Greece, only a few of the thousands of people who arrived daily 
registered for asylum there, while the vast majority of migrants and asylum seekers moved on 
towards central Europe (EC 2017, 1). This secondary movement occurs because Greece is 
usually not a first choice for refugees due to its already overwhelmed system for receiving 
refugees and limited economic opportunities. As a result, many prefer to pass through Greece to 
enter the rest of Europe and apply for protection there (Collett 2016). This secondary movement 
is technically illegal because asylum seekers are supposed to apply for asylum in the first country 
that they arrive in once in the EU. 
The stated purpose of the EU-Turkey deal of April 2016 was threefold: “reducing both 
the number of persons arriving irregularly to the EU and the loss of life in the Aegean whilst 
providing safe and legal routes to the EU for those in need” (EC 2017, 4). The terms of the EU-
Turkey deal allow Greece to return all “irregular migrants” to Turkey (EU-Turkey statement 
2016). Irregular migrants include those who do not apply or do not qualify for asylum, as well as 
those who apply for asylum but have arrived from a safe country where they could have claimed 
protection (Collett 2016). Turkey, the country most refugees pass through to get to Greece, is 
being designated a safe country under the terms of the deal (Collett 2016). This is the first time 
that the EU has adopted a policy of returning asylum seekers because they have passed through a 
“safe country” outside the EU. Because the deal defines Turkey as a safe country, all incoming 
asylum-seekers arriving in Greece from Turkey are eligible for deportation. Turkey also pledged 
to crack down on smugglers illegally transporting refugees to Greece (EU-Turkey statement 
2016). In exchange, the EU pledged to resettle one Syrian refugee residing in Turkey for every 
Syrian returned to Turkey from Greece; accelerate making Turkey a member of the EU through 
visa liberation for Turkish nationals; and boost financial support for Turkey’s refugees (EU-
Turkey statement 2016). In effect, the deal shifts the burden of the EU’s migrant flows onto 
Greece and Turkey to stop secondary movement, dissuade refugees from coming to Greece in 
the first place, and essentially close its borders. 
Based on the deal’s own stated objectives, it could be called a success. The deal 
accomplished the stated goal of reducing the number of irregular arrivals to the EU. The number 
of arrivals dropped by 97% immediately after the deal was enacted, from 5,005 people daily in 
December 2015 to 43 people daily in March 2016 (EC 2017, 2). Furthermore, the deal achieved 
the stated goal of reducing the “the loss of life in the Aegean,” as the number of deaths in the 
Aegean decreased from 1,145 in the year before the statement to 80 in the year which followed 
(EC 2017, 2). Finally, the stated goal of “providing safe and legal routes to the EU for those in 
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 need” could be considered successful if one’s definition of “those in need” excludes all irregular 
migrants coming from Turkey. Indeed, the EU Commission reports that the implementation of 
the EU-Turkey deal has been a success (EC 2017, 1). 
However, success depends on how the results are defined. While the deal is successful 
based on the EU’s own objectives, the deal is a failure in terms of the EU’s ethical and legal 
commitment to refugee protection. By focusing on burden-shifting and deterrence rather than 
focusing on protection, the results of the deal are a humanitarian failure. 
In Greece, the deal has shifted the responsibility of reception in the EU onto Greece, a 
country that already received the majority of refugees coming to the EU—around 885,000 out of 
one million EU arrivals in 2015 (EC 2017, 1). While the deal has decreased the number of 
arrivals in Greece overall, the deal has actually caused the number of arrivals registering for 
asylum there to increase. Before the deal, only a few thousand arrivals actually stayed in  
Greece and applied for asylum there; most traveled on to wealthier countries in the EU (EC 
2017, 1). After the deal, blocked entry to the rest of Europe transformed Greece overnight from a 
passageway to the final destination, as asylum seekers are left with no option but to apply for 
protection in Greece. As a result, Greece has become overwhelmed by the enormously increased 
task of processing claims, holding refugees in camps while they wait, and granting asylum 
(Collett 2016). It may seem like the burden would not be so substantial because Greece can 
return the asylum-seekers to Turkey. Yet, in practice Greece can return only a limited number of 
migrants because it cannot process asylum claims quickly in its overwhelmed system, and other 
EU states are reluctant to assist (Collett 2016). With Greece’s system so overburdened, the deal 
has deteriorated protection for refugees in Greece. Thousands of refugees are living in 
challenging conditions, often without basic needs met, while waiting for Greece’s overloaded 
system to process their asylum applications or return them to Turkey (Gogou 2017). Amnesty 
International reports: 
On the Greek islands the harrowing human cost of the deal is laid bare. Not 
allowed to leave, thousands of asylum-seekers live in a tortuous limbo. Women, 
men and children languish in inhumane conditions, sleeping in flimsy tents, 
braving the snow and are sometimes the victims of violent hate crimes. Five 
refugees on Lesvos, including a child, have died amid such conditions. After the 
deaths of three men in Moria camp in January 2017, one man living there told 
Amnesty International: “This is a grave for humans. It is hell.” Another 20-year-
old Syrian refugee said: “I escaped Syria to avoid jail but now I am imprisoned” 
(Gogou 2017). 
These conditions do not meet the standards of protection under the guidelines set forth by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that include access to adequate 
living standards, work, education, health care, and access to a secure legal status (Dimitriadi 
2016, 5). 
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Meanwhile, the EU has also shifted its responsibility to protect by returning refugees to 
Turkey, at a significant humanitarian cost. Turkey had already been overloaded with refugees, 
even more so than Greece, due to its closer proximity to refugee countries of origin; quarantining 
refugees in Turkey merely increases that burden. Yet, the EU-Turkey deal deflects the 
responsibility of Europe—one of the wealthiest continents in the world—to Turkey, a country 
already hosting 3 million refugees. Thus, the deal strains the resources of an already strained 
system. This is especially troubling given that Turkey’s designation as a “safe third country” is 
dubious. First, Turkey’s authoritarian drift could mean that the nation will “place greater weight 
on securing financial assistance or political backing from rich donor countries, than on 
responding to local grievances about the presence of refugees” (Boswell 2003). Therefore, 
societal tensions could be exacerbated and not adequately addressed, which could threaten 
refugee safety and assimilation. Second, Turkey has tightened its borders and returned refugees 
back to Syria, in direct violation of international law that establishes that refugees cannot 
forcibly be returned to their countries of origin (Amnesty International 2016). Third, reports 
indicate that conditions at Turkey’s refugee camps fail to provide basic human services such as 
clean water, emergency medical services, and protection from dangers such as kidnappings 
(Amnesty International 2016). It is estimated that about 3 million asylum seekers and refugees in 
Turkey are left to find shelter on their own (Dimitriadi 2016, 5). As with Greece, these 
conditions contrast with the UNHCR standards of protection. Thus, Turkey is not a safe country 
for refugees. 
Besides the immediate humanitarian costs, deteriorated protection in Greece and Turkey 
due to burden-shifting under the deal could exacerbate the structural conditions that  
force refugees to flee in the first place. In the long term, refugees fleeing from conflict-torn states 
like Syria can play a critical role in rebuilding their countries of origin after the fighting is over 
(Betts 2016). For refugees to rebuild, they need to be alive, healthy, educated, and able to work. 
Yet the  deal fails to provide even basic needs, let alone access to education or work. As a result, 
the deal inhibits reconstruction in refugee-producing countries, which is needed to address the 
cause of displacement in the first place. 
Finally, the record level of burden-shifting in this deal could set a disturbing precedent of 
wealthy countries closing their borders and outsourcing responsibility to refugees onto other, less 
safe countries. Indeed, some argue that the deal tells developing countries that “their cooperation 
on migration is a commodity that is rapidly increasing in value,” while it tells developed 
countries that their responsibilities to refugees are optional (Alfred 2016). The ripple effects are 
already visible, as European leaders are now calling for similar deals with countries in North 
Africa (Alfred 2016). For example, the EU is looking to replicate a similar deal with Libya, “a 
country where both the United Nations (UN) and the German Foreign Ministry have reported 
torture and execution in migrant camps” (Lovett, Whelan, and Rendón 2017). 
The humanitarian costs to the EU burden-shifting its responsibility to protect render the 
EU-Turkey deal a failure on legal and ethical grounds. Legally, such burden-shifting 
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erodes the international legal standards enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. As per the 
convention, refugees have a right to seek asylum, have their individual claims examined, and, by 
the principle of non-refoulement, to not be forcibly returned to their countries of origin. 
However, the EU-Turkey deal prevents asylum seekers from seeking refugee status in the EU—
which they have a right to under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The result is that asylum-seekers 
in Greece and Turkey do not have access to the adequate living standards, appropriate 
accommodation, and services they are entitled to under UNHCR standards of protection 
(Dimitriadi 2016, 5). Thus, the EU-Turkey deal is a failure because it legally and ethically 
violates the EU’s humanitarian responsibility towards individuals seeking international 
protection.  
Some may argue that the EU-Turkey deal is not a failure because its objectives of saving 
lives at sea and providing safe routes to the EU for those in need are humanitarian; however, this 
claim is invalid because the actual humanitarian effects of those objectives are dubious. While 
there are fewer deaths in the Aegean Sea, it is questionable that more lives are being saved 
overall. In addition, there are not enough safe routes to the EU being provided for those in need.  
First, the objective of saving lives at sea must be understood within the larger context of 
the refugee crisis. Although the number of people taking the dangerous route across the Aegean 
Sea has decreased, the number of people in need of asylum has not—the people in need have not 
disappeared. Instead, the refugees who would have crossed the Aegean are now either still inside 
their own war-torn countries, resigned to fleeing to countries in the Middle East like Turkey and 
Jordan who are already hosting a significant refugee population, or taking different, more 
dangerous routes to the EU as a result of the blocked Aegean route. Thus, while it is true that the 
number of lives lost in the Aegean Sea has decreased, many of the would-be Aegean crossers’ 
lives are likely still at risk—just elsewhere. It is impossible to track how many asylum-seekers 
are now trying alternate, more dangerous routes to the EU, but it is certain that some people will 
always try to make their way into the EU as long as it offers the promise of a better life. Thus, it 
is unclear whether the reduction of deaths in the Aegean has actually saved more lives overall. 
More importantly, the focus on the deaths prevented in the Aegean Sea diverts attention from the 
deal’s failure to protect refugees and ensure quality protection.  
Second, it is not clear that the deal does anything to provide safe routes to the EU for 
those in need, other than allowing Syrian refugees in Turkey to resettle in the EU per the 1:1 
agreement. Yet, that policy discriminates one nationality over others, and to date only 9,383 
Syrian refugees have been resettled—a pitiful number compared to the need (EC 2017, 3). 
Moreover, the objective of “providing safe and legal routes to the EU for those in need” excludes 
irregularly arriving asylum-seekers coming from Turkey, who are now eligible to be returned to 
Turkey. That exclusion is unacceptable, because many of those asylum-seekers are in need of 
protection—protection that Turkey cannot adequately provide. 
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Thus, while the EU-Turkey deal is successful based on its own objectives, those 
objectives are problematic. Evaluating the deal based on the legal and ethical responsibility to 
protect refugees reveals a far more harrowing outcome. The deal is a failure because burden-
shifting has resulted in an erosion of the EU’s ethical and legal responsibility to protect refugees, 
at a humanitarian cost evidenced by the reality on the ground.  
The humanitarian consequences are enough reason to deem the deal a failure. However, 
beyond humanitarian reasons, there are also grounds to question the prudence of the deal based 
on its potential economic and collective security consequences. The deal could exacerbate the 
ongoing economic crisis in Greece and by extension the EU’s integrated economy. While the EU 
is providing some financial support to Greece to help with reception, Greece still bears an undue 
burden for the direct and indirect costs of receiving asylum-seekers. One example of indirect 
costs is tourism. Due to the accumulation of irregular migrants in Greece as claims are processed 
now that entry to the rest of Europe is blocked, tourism dropped 80 percent on some Greek 
islands such as Lesvos in 2016 (Dimitriadi 2016, 8). The loss of tourism is a significant blow to 
the Greek economy, especially while the country is in the middle of an economic crisis. 
In addition, the deal could pose a threat to global security. Before the deal, Turkey 
already had a refugee population of 3 million; the deal increased that number even more. 
Especially in wake of the recent coup in Turkey on June 15, 2016, this burden could disrupt 
international security (Betts and Loescher 2011, 17); when “large numbers of refugees 
arereceived in areas of acute poverty or escalating civil conflict, the effects can be highly 
destabilizing” (Boswell 2003). Refugees can be destabilizing due to social tensions. As 
mentioned previously, Turkey’s authoritarian drift makes it less likely to respond to and mitigate 
social conflicts between local and refugee populations. The tensions that arise could be 
“explosive” (Boswell 2003). Refugees can also be destabilizing due to the economic strain it puts 
on already poverty-stricken areas. The destabilizing effect of more refugees in Turkey could be 
mitigated with the EU’s promised refugee aid and one for one resettlement exchange. However, 
the EU has been slow to follow through with these promises after the coup (Yeginsu 2016). 
Thus, the burden-shifting in the EU-Turkey deal deteriorates protection for refugees and 
could destabilize the EU economy and global security. These consequences could be further 
amplified in significance if the EU-Turkey deal sets a precedent. 
Causes of Burden-shifting 
The humanitarian, economic, and global security costs of burden-shifting are clear. Yet, 
to provide a solution that shares rather than shifts the EU’s responsibility to refugees, it is 
necessary to understand the reasons for burden-shifting in the first place. This paper identifies 
three main causes of burden-sharing failure on international, national, and individual levels. 
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On an international level, the current weak legal basis for international cooperation 
helped to enable the burden-shifting approach to the EU-Turkey deal. The 1990 Dublin 
regulation established that the country where a refugee first enters the EU is responsible for 
processing their asylum request and granting them asylum if eligible (Fratzke 2015, 1). This puts 
an unequal burden on front-line states closest to refugee countries of origin, such as Greece, who 
must process and grant asylum to the bulk of refugees entering the EU. Also, the EU’s burden-
sharing initiatives for the physical relocation of refugees are all based on voluntary pledging 
(Thielemann 2012, 819). In summary, there is little legal basis for equitable international burden-
sharing for refugees in the EU. 
 On a national level, another cause of burden-sharing failure is the prioritization of 
strategic national interests. Accepting refugees comes at economic, social, and political costs. 
Economically, states are concerned about resettling refugees because of the “direct costs of 
subsistence, schooling, healthcare, [and] the determining process” (Thielemann 2003, 227). The 
resources required are substantial; for example, Britain spends about 30,000 euros per asylum 
seeker, while current policies under the European Refugee Fund only refund a fraction of that 
cost (Thielemann 2006, 20). Socially, states are concerned about the “more indirect costs of 
social integration” (Thielemann 2003, 227). States reason that foreign asylum-seekers create 
social tensions, especially within the relatively homogenous populations of most EU member 
states (Buonanno and Nugent 2013, 34). This social tension creates political tensions. Indeed, 
refugees have caused huge levels of political unrest among native populations in France, Britain, 
and Germany, and can be considered a potential cause  
of the rise in populist sentiments in Europe today. Therefore, negative public opinion makes 
policymakers reticent to sharing the burden of physical relocation of refugees. Refugee 
immigration is never popular among domestic populations, as voters tend to overestimate the 
chance that they will become victims of small but highly publicized risks, such as terrorist 
attacks. Across Europe, about 50 percent believe that refugees are a major threat and will 
increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country (Stokes 2016). One needs to look no further 
than the anti-immigration rhetoric that fueled Brexit debates (De Freytas-Tamura 2016) and the 
campaign of Marine Le Pen in the French election to recognize the political obstacles of granting 
asylum. Especially after Brexit, it has become clear that there is more at stake than popularity if 
policymakers in the EU do not take the anti-immigration sentiment of the public seriously; the 
EU could collapse if more refugees are accepted.  
 Finally, examining the state-level rationale for evading responsibility reveals another 
layer of causation for burden-shifting: a shortsighted conceptualization of the refugee crisis on 
the individual level. EU policymakers who created the EU-Turkey deal conceptualized the 
refugee influx as a zero-sum issue, in which benefitting refugees incurs inevitable costs. This 
implicit assumption of EU policymakers is evident in the terms of the EU-Turkey deal, which 
focuses on preventing irregular migrants from ever reaching the EU. However, if EU 
policymakers conceptualize refugee flows as a permanent, enduring reality, they might consider 
that closing borders will not reduce migration flows in the long run and the refugee influx may 
be positive for the European economy and society over time. 
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In conceptualizing refugee flows as a temporary phenomenon rather a long-term problem, 
EU policymakers failed to recognize that closing borders will not reduce migration flows in the 
long run. The causes of refugee migration are deep structural problems like civil wars, repressive 
regimes, and environmental disasters—none of which are likely to disappear soon. Even current 
crises like the conflict in Syria may take years to end, and, in the longer-term, new crises will 
come to take Syria’s place. In reality, increased mobility due to globalization and likely 
increased displacement due to climate change suggest that forced migration will only increase 
(Betts 2015). Meanwhile, the stability and quality of protection in Europe will always be a draw 
for refugees. When one route closes, those who are desperate enough will find another way in. 
Thus, closing borders is shortsighted because it only redirects the migration flows temporarily, 
but does not stop them in the long run. 
Moreover, the desire to stop refugees from entering the EU is also shortsighted because 
refugees could actually benefit the EU in the long term. While states face the short and medium-
term costs of providing immediate basic needs to refugees, processing asylum applications, and 
integrating refugees socially and economically, studies show that the refugee influx may be 
positive for the European economy and society in the long run (Karakas 2015, 2-3). In particular, 
refugees can contribute to GDP growth as workers who can “fill important niches both in fast-
growing and declining sectors of the economy” (Karakas 2015, 2-3) and make up for Europe’s 
aging population (Karakas 2015, 5). This economic benefit could address the current economic 
uncertainty within the EU due to the zone’s poor recovery from the disruption of the financial 
crash, the debt crisis in Greece, and the Brexit movement (McRae 2016). EU policymakers’ 
decision to burden-shift is myopic because while hosting refugees comes as a cost, it is an 
investment that could benefit the nation’s economy in the long run. 
In short, burden-shifting is caused by a flawed international framework, national self-
interest, and individual shortsightedness of the issue. 
 
Solution: The Case for Burden-sharing 
To improve burden-sharing refugee relocation within the EU and its humanitarian 
consequences, this paper recommends that policy solutions address the flawed international 
framework, state self-interest, and individual shortsightedness detailed above. One promising 
approach is a market-based strategy. Market-based strategies take account of economic and 
political incentives rather than just moral obligation—which states often do not respond to when 
that obligation conflicts with national self-interest.  
One market-based solution for burden-sharing the resettlement of refugees is a tradable 
refugee quota system coupled with a matching mechanism. Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga and 
Hillel Rapoport are two scholars that have advocated a similar plan (Moraga and Rapoport 2014, 
94-108). A tradable refugee quota system would designate each member of the EU a certain 
quota of refugees to resettle. However, these quotas are tradable with other countries on a 
refugee quota market, similar to a cap and trade system. States who wish to settle fewer refugees 
than their quotas require will have to pay other states to take their undesired quotas, thereby 
compensating for that additional burden. As a result, tradable refugee quotas would exploit 
countries’ comparative advantages in hosting refugees efficiently. This system would be coupled  
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with a matching mechanism to further maximize state interests. With a refugee matching system, 
legal routes to sanctuary in EU states would be available through humanitarian visas from 
embassies in countries like Greece and Turkey. Asylum-seekers who demonstrate a legitimate 
need can collect a humanitarian visa that allows them to pay for their own travel to an EU 
member state where they will finish their asylum application. A computer program would match 
asylum-seekers with humanitarian visas to EU member-state destinations based on both 
preferences (Betts 2016). The matchmaking scheme would protect refugees from undertaking 
dangerous journeys via smugglers and require other states to share the responsibility of granting 
and processing asylum.  
This policy of tradable refugee quotas with a matching mechanism tackles the causes of 
burden-shifting. National self-interest is addressed because the tradable quota system gives states 
incentives to resettle refugees and costs for not resettling them. In other words, states that accept 
additional refugees are compensated, while states that accept fewer refugees foot the bill. This 
policy also incentivizes states to host refugees because they can rank their refugee preferences—
for example, by language, job skills, family reunification, etc. 
This could be an economic as well as a political incentive, because states can choose refugees 
that will most benefit their economy and be welcomed into their society. In addition, this policy 
addresses individual-level shortsightedness because the refugee preference system helps 
policymakers to consider the long-term economic benefits the state will gain from investing in a 
refugee. Finally, the policy addresses the flawed international framework because the policy 
would require a certain number of refugees to be resettled, unlike the voluntary pledging system 
in place today. Even as quotas are traded, the overall number of refugees resettled would be the 
same. The current flaw in the international legal framework of frontline states carrying most of 
the refugee burden is also mitigated because of the criteria for which states are responsible now 
depends on the quota system and matching mechanism. Thus, the legal framework of this policy 
would enforce burden-sharing.  
There are many details that need to be solidified before such a policy could be 
implemented. However, this proposal is, at the very least, useful as an example of how to 
approach the burden-sharing failure of refugees in the EU in a way that addresses the causes of 
burden-shifting. A tradable refugee quota system along with a matching mechanism thus offers a 
potential solution for the EU sharing the responsibility of hosting refugees. 
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that this policy will be impossible to enact 
without overcoming the political obstacles against refugee relocation. This policy addresses the 
economic interests of states, but is weaker in addressing their political motives in terms of the 
negative public opinion against hosting refugees. While an extended discussion of overcoming 
public hostility against refugees is beyond the scope of this paper, this paper has highlighted two 
possible tactics for changing public opinion. From a strategic perspective, policymakers could 
convince the public that hosting refugees has a “weak but positive” (Betts 2016) economic effect 
in the long run and that granting asylum to refugees could decrease their chances of 
radicalization into terrorists (Barnes-Dacey 2016). From a humanitarian perspective, 
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 policymakers could communicate the refugees’ suffering to appeal to the public’s conscience. 
Whatever arguments policymakers make to persuade public opinion, what is important is that 
they make an argument at all, rather than letting the public’s largely unfounded fears prevent 
refugees from safety. 
The EU-Turkey deal is a failure in terms of the EU’s ethical and legal commitment to 
refugee protection. By putting an undue burden on Greece and Turkey, the deal incurs 
humanitarian costs, as well as consequences for the EU economy and international security. The 
flawed international legal framework, prioritization of national interests, and myopic 
conceptualization of the crisis cause states to burden-shift their responsibility to provide refuge. 
The enduring character of refugee flows demands that the EU creates comprehensive, long-term 
solutions to address the continuing influx of refugees, for socioeconomic, security-related, and 
moral reasons. This paper recommends that the EU improve upon sharing its responsibility to 
protect refugees through market-based policies such as tradable refugee quotas with a matching 
mechanism. Refugees have the right to seek asylum. In reality, the EU-Turkey deal prevents 
refugees from reaching safety. Refugees have the right to start a new life in a new country where 
they are safe. In reality, they are left in an almost indefinite state of uncertainty waiting in 
detention centers in Greece or stranded in Turkey. States claim they share the responsibility of 
welcoming refugees into the safety within their borders. In reality, countries like Greece and 
Turkey that are already strained and under-resourced are taking in the majority of the refugees, 
while wealthy countries within the EU are closing their borders. With 51 million people 
displaced from their homes today and no end to the crisis in sight, the need to transform the 
reality refugees face is urgent. Closing the borders is not an option. 
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Environmental Multilateralism: Climate Change and American Decline 
Irina Bukharin 
Swarthmore College 
The United States’ poor record of leadership in international environmental policy grows 
more concerning as the impending effects of unrestrained climate change become increasingly 
apparent. Though it is the country most able to provide effective leadership, the U.S. is routinely 
condemned for acting unilaterally, often in ways that undermine international agreements that it 
sees as counter to American interests (Ivanova 2008, 58). Robert Falkner, political scientist at the 
London School of Economics, explains: “America’s hegemony has formed the basis for both 
international leadership and veto power in environmental regime formation” (2005, 585). This 
lack of international systemic restraint, coupled with the absence of a clear “global strategic 
imperative” to act on climate change, means that the decentralized U.S. foreign policy apparatus 
and competition among domestic interest groups can produce variation in U.S. and foreign 
environmental policy (Falkner 2005; 586, 589). Falkner concludes that “renewed US [sic] 
environmental leadership is only possible as a result of strong public demand, supported by 
institutionalized pressure from environmental groups and business interests acting in favor of 
international regulation” (2005, 597). Falkner’s basic outline of the conditions necessary for the 
U.S. to assume environmental leadership is helpful in creating a model for promoting positive 
change in U.S. environmental policy. 
Leadership by the U.S. is necessary to create a strong plan for reducing the effects of 
climate change. As Falkner argues, since the U.S. is the global hegemon, it has the ability to  
work unilaterally or multilaterally, an option that impedes stable global cooperation on climate 
change. American hegemony is not a constant, however; it is in decline. It is in the United States’ 
best interest to lead the world in climate negotiations, not only to protect the environment and 
current related American interests, but also to secure an advantage in the international climate 
agreement that will serve future American interests. Many American leaders might reject this 
argument, so it is important to look at a case study in order to understand the conditions under 
which the U.S. would assume the necessary leadership role. U.S. environmental and business 
interests aligned because of the mutual reinforcement of scientific evidence and widespread 
public support. The alignment between these two core interests allowed the U.S. to lead efforts 
that resulted in the creation of the Montreal Protocol. The U.S. used its power as hegemon to 
help create the Montreal Protocol, which in turn helped maintain future U.S. advantages in 
certain areas.  
Even without the threat of future decline, it is in the United States’ interests to work 
multilaterally to mitigate the effects of climate change, as environmental consequences will 
directly harm U.S. national interests and cannot be stopped unilaterally. Climate change has  
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already had a substantial net negative impact on food production, foreshadowing the food 
insecurity that will result from climate change (IPCC 2005; 5, 13). More indirectly related 
security threats may arise as well; natural disasters, which have and will continue to increase in 
frequency and severity “may, when coupled with other triggers, do more to destabilize the  
government than an armed attack on the nation or its capital” (Busby 2008, 476). The U.S. has 
an interest in preventing states from failing, which can lead to regional conflict; so it has an 
interest in stopping events related to climate change. Furthermore, the U.S. will be expected to 
give aid to the most afflicted countries, and some of this money and support may come from the 
military (Busby 2008; 475, 476). Even if the United States were to remain a hegemon 
indefinitely, its interests lie in preventing climate change, not just for moral reasons, but for more 
pragmatic national interest reasons as well.  
International cooperation is necessary for successful climate change action, and it will not 
occur without American leadership. The negative environmental actions of one country 
frequently affect other countries in unforeseen and unavoidable ways, so “individual states are 
ill-equipped to respond alone to the myriad of challenges posed by transboundary environmental, 
social, and health problems” (Schreurs 1997, 1). Additionally, due to the costs of being the first 
state to act and the problems that can arise with free riders, the international community needs a 
regulatory system to ensure the long-term viability of any international efforts to combat climate 
change (Figueres 2012).  For several reasons, this will not happen without American leadership. 
Not only has the U.S. historically been a force for developing international organizations and 
treaties, but treaties that are not supported by the U.S. are often seen as less legitimate (Ivanova 
2008, 58). Furthermore, because the U.S. is the largest contributor to man-made climate change, 
it is essential the U.S. visibly work to find a solution, otherwise other countries will argue that it 
is unfair for them to pay to fix the problem that the U.S. had a large part in creating (Falkner 
2005, 591). In short, without American participation, no international environmental action can 
have true legitimacy, stability, and success (Falkner 2005, 591).  
Falkner is correct that while America remains a hegemon and does not see environmental 
issues as a matter of national security, it will continue to have the choice to act unilaterally or 
multilaterally, and this choice will be decided by domestic politics. One thing that he does not 
consider is that while America does have flexibility in international environmental politics now, 
it will eventually lose the power that comes with being a hegemon. Because of this, it is in the 
United States’ long-term interests to establish an international climate change agreement now, 
using its power to create a system that will benefit it when American power diminishes in the 
future. To do this would not be to act under structural pressure, but to foresee a situation where 
structural forces may have more power. This means that the U.S. will not automatically work to 
create a climate change agreement, so it is necessary to use Falkner’s arguments to determine 
what domestic conditions must exist for the U.S. to act in its long-term interests. Domestic 
politics are primarily influenced by environmental interests, business interests, and public 
opinion, which are informed by scientific evidence and consensus, determining factors that 
Falkner does not adequately address. All of these arguments can be seen in the case of American 
leadership preventing destruction of the ozone through the Montreal Protocol.  
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American power has peaked; it should work while it still has a significant advantage over 
other countries to maximize its power and capabilities for the future, when it exists in a 
multipolar world. Although its military advantage will likely remain strong for the foreseeable 
future, trade war is currently much more likely than traditional inter-state conflict. The American 
military is useful in engaging in regional conflicts, but it is less relevant in the negotiation of 
environmental treaties (Young 1994, 136). On the other hand, economic power can increase a 
hegemon’s bargaining power, as a hegemon can better cajole and coerce using the promise of 
trade or assistance, soft power, or the threat of sanctions (Falkner 2005, 588). However, the 
American share of the world economy has been decreasing since 1950, while the Chinese share 
of the world economy has been increasing since then and is now larger than the American share 
(Thompson 2012, Thompson 2015). As “the old order dominated by the US [sic] and Europe is 
giving way to one increasingly shared with non-Western rising states,” American dominance is 
coming to a close, even if not in the immediate future (Ikenberry 2011, 56). In an increasingly 
multipolar world, the U.S. will not be able to act unilaterally or multilaterally depending solely 
on its domestic politics. Instead, the international system, and the great powers in the 
international system, will have a larger influence on how America acts.  
In order to preserve American interests, the U.S. would benefit from establishing 
international environmental treaties that favor U.S. interests and give the U.S. a position of 
power for future negotiations, thus “locking in” American power that might otherwise dissipate. 
In the past, across a variety of issues, the U.S. has created structures that favor it, and thereby has 
“spun a web of institutions that connected other states to an emerging American-dominated 
economic and security order” (Ikenberry 2001, 21). This can be seen in the United Nations, 
where the U.S. has veto power due to its permanent seat on the Security Council. Even though 
these institutions have been built primarily by Western nations, rising nations do not want to 
change the structure or guiding rules of the international order; they want to gain more power 
within it (Ikenberry 2011, 57). This indicates that there might be little pushback against an 
international treaty concerning climate change, so long as it includes developing nations. 
Although this may partially restrain the U.S., “now may be the best time for the United States 
and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for the new era, ensuring that it continues 
to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the 
twentieth century” (Ikenberry 2011, 58). This means creating a comprehensive international 
treaty to mitigate the effects of climate change while preserving American interests before they 
must be ceded to a multipolar world order.  
The Montreal Protocol is often cited as the best example of both international cooperation 
and American leadership on an environmental issue. In 1973, scientific evidencebegan to 
indicate that certain chemicals used in refrigerants and aerosols, among other things, could be 
destroying the ozone layer, which would increase levels of skin cancer and damage crops. The 
agreement to phase out these ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) was ratified in 1985, a mere 
twelve years after the first scientific discovery. At this point in time, all nations in the United 
Nations have ratified the original Montreal Protocol (UNEP 2014). In this case the U.S. was a 
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 key player, and it led the successful phase-out of ODSs that were damaging the ozone layer 
(Ivanova 2008, 57). The role of American hegemony in creating this treaty provides a coherent, 
though perhaps overly simplified, model for what needs to happen for American leadership to 
occur on a climate treaty, as prescribed by Falkner. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, 
industrial interests shifted to favoring increased regulation after a vocal public demanded it. This 
shift was founded on the increasingly clear scientific evidence of the reality of ozone depletion. 
Additionally, the treaty gave an advantage to and protected the American chemical industry in 
the long term.  
Support from the chemical industry was crucial in allowing the U.S. to have a pro-
international regulation position, as business interests often impede environmental legislation. 
According to Falkner, “environmental groups and business interests frequently pull in opposite 
directions when it comes to managing environmental problems,” which causes “rifts within the 
domestic constituency of US foreign environmental policy” (2005, 595). Businesses often feel it 
is unfair for their economic interests to be sacrificed for the sake of environmental protection, 
and they lobby heavily in the name of protecting the U.S. economy (Sussman 2004, 352). In this 
they are often successful, as they have political access and money to donate to politicians’ 
campaigns (Harris 2001, 22). However, businesses will strongly support international legislation 
if they are already subject to similar domestic regulations, and “much international 
environmental regulation appears on the international  
agenda through the process of internationalizing domestic regulation” (Falkner 2005, 595). 
The chemical industry eventually supported ODS regulation due to falling sales and the 
realization that this regulation would give them an advantage in creating substitutes. As soon as 
the ozone depletion theory became widespread, the sale of products using ODSs in the U.S. fell 
by nearly two thirds (Benedick 1991, 28). Although initially the industry was opposed to any 
regulation, “soon after the first signs of consumer disquiet showed, industry opposition to the 
CFC-ozone theory began to crumble” (Harris 2001, 164). In response to this pressure, firms 
began developing alternatives to ODSs (Benedick 1991, 31). Because of this shift, American 
chemical companies began to support international regulation that would then “level the playing 
field” and stop foreign companies from using the cheaper ODSs for their competing products 
(Benedick 1991, 31). They realized that this regulation would create a market for substitutes that 
only large, wealthy corporations could develop, and since the major American corporations had 
already started developing these alternatives, they recognized that international regulation would 
give them a long-term advantage (Schreurs 1997, 75). This support gave legitimacy to pro-
regulation advocates and made it easier for American legislators and diplomats to champion this 
regulation at home and abroad.  
It is clear that business support would not have occurred without pressure from the 
public, which has also helped to shape environmental legislation. Although politicians do listen 
to the preferences of businesses, “if enough of their constituents are concerned about an issue, 
they will usually work to promote those concerns in policy,” as they want to be reelected (Harris 
2001, 22). Generally, strong public support is required for the U.S. to take action in global  
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environmental policy initiatives, so environmental groups often spend much of their time 
lobbying citizens in addition to lawmakers, in an effort to achieve widespread bottom-up 
pressure (Sussman 2004, 352).  
The widespread public reaction to the unfolding reality of ozone depletion spurred 
American leadership on international ODS regulation. As stated before, once the scientific 
community coalesced around the new theory, “US [sic] consumer response was swift and 
significant,” which influenced the position of the chemical industry (Schreurs 1997, 75). This 
response was the result of the “powerful and evocative pictures of ozone depletion simulations 
[that] appeared in magazines” and “captured the US [sic] public’s imagination” (Schreurs 1997, 
75; Benedick 1991, 27). Americans had access to and were interested in the data and results that 
American scientists, from prominent universities and organizations such as the University of 
Michigan, NOAA, and NASA, were finding. Because of that, Americans began acting on their 
environmental concerns (Benedick 1991, 29). Citizens changed their purchasing habits and 
lobbied their representatives in office, and in this way, “a well-informed public was the 
prerequisite to mobilizing the political will of governments and to weakening industry’s resolve 
to defend the chemicals” (Benedick 1991, 5).  
Until this point, Falkner’s argument fits the narrative of American leadership in creating 
the Montreal Protocol. However, he underestimates the role of scientific evidence and consensus 
in strengthening public support and weakening business leverage. Because businesses do not 
want to appear anti-environmentalist, much of their resistance comes in the form of questioning 
the scientific evidence and conclusions drawn. Due to this tendency, “the more uncertain the 
science, the more interest group politics will come into play” (Schreurs 1997, 89). Additionally, 
people are more likely to care if there seems to be imminent danger to themselves or their way of 
life, so “robust action by the United States is much more likely if there is clear scientific 
evidence that the health of Americans or the U.S. economy would be harmed or if there are clear 
signs that environmental changes are causing substantial human suffering abroad” (Harris 2001, 
17). From this perspective, environmental change can be seen more clearly as a matter of 
national security, which will both increase public pressure for action and induce more reticent 
public officials to acquiesce. Finally, collaboration between scientists and government officials 
can be crucial in helping legislators understand what is at stake, which will encourage them to 
take action (Sussman 2004, 350).  
The role of science and scientists was pivotal in building public support, degrading 
industrial opposition, and pushing government officials to stop ozone depletion. None of the 
widespread public support would have been possible without credible evidence. In particular, 
“the public announcement during 1985 of the Antarctic ozone hole played an important role  
in mobilizing public concern” (Young 1994, 44). It is also telling that “the entire public policy 
debate revolved around the validity of scientific claims and whether those claims were strong 
and significant enough to pursue active regulation of CFC products,” as it indicates that scientific 
evidence was the primary point of dissension, not whether or not the proposed risks were worth 
accepting (Harris 2001, 187). Eventually, after more scientific research, it was widely accepted 
that damage to the ozone layer would be harmful both to human health and the environment,  
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which was the turning point in creating both a domestic and international coalition that was 
powerful enough to create the international regulations (Benedick 1991, 22). In addition, 
collaboration between scientists and government officials was critical in that scientists provided 
them with clear measures that were needed to prevent further ozone depletion (Benedick 1991, 
5). Conclusive scientific evidence was the motor that propelled the U.S. to demand international 
regulation on ODSs, and without it there will be little incentive for any future environmental 
regulation.  
Besides illustrating the conditions necessary for domestic consensus, the Montreal 
Protocol demonstrates how American hegemony can influence international environmental 
regime building and how it can preserve American interests for the future. As argued earlier, 
U.S. leadership is necessary in creating successful international environmental legislation, and 
the Montreal Protocol was no exception (Ivanova 2008, 59). Because the U.S. emitted the largest 
amount of ODSs and greenhouse gases, other states would have felt exploited if the U.S. did not 
participate in ODS regulation (Benedick 1991, 206). Instead, “the US [sic] government set the 
example by being the first to take regulatory action against the suspect chemicals,” which 
encouraged other states to participate as well (Benedick 1991, 206). The U.S. went beyond this, 
however, as they threatened trade restrictions against nations that did not take responsibility for 
emissions and “made certain that the implications of this threat were not lost on foreign 
governments, pointing out that there might be a price to pay for not joining in meaningful efforts 
to protect the ozone layer” (Benedick 1991, 29). The U.S. was able to apply pressure because of 
the American economy’s “nodal position” that “affords it a unique opportunity to use economic 
pressure in the pursuit of environmental objectives” (Falkner 2005, 590). Restricting trade with 
other countries was an asymmetrical threat, as other countries could not individually create the 
same level of restrictions. In these ways, American hegemony allowed the U.S. to do more to 
form an international coalition against ozone depletion than any other single nation could have 
done.  
Because of American leadership on the treaty, the Montreal Protocol institutionalized 
American interests for the future, even in a fairly narrow area of regulation. The primary benefit 
of the U.S.’s role in the Montreal Protocol was that it allowed American chemical companies to 
have an advantage in the international market, as their greater resources and early research on 
alternatives allowed them to “capture” the market for the chemicals that replaced ODSs, which 
gave them a long-term advantage (Benedick 1991, 206). Furthermore, the U.S. established itself 
as a leader on the issue, ensuring that any future international ozone agreement must be agreed 
upon with the U.S. This power, though less tangible than the business advantage, guaranteed 
long-term American influence on the subject and afforded the U.S. the opportunity to shape 
future regulations in favor of American interests. In this case, besides protecting global human 
and environmental health, American hegemony secured American interests that would not have 
been assured otherwise. For environmentalists who want to stop climate change and for 
policymakers who realize that American power is temporary, the Montreal Protocol, under an 
analysis similar to Falkner’s, offers the foundation of a plan to institutionalize an American 
approach to climate change. In order to use American hegemony to create an international treaty  
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that attacks climate change while securing American interests, these environmentalists and 
policymakers must work to establish certain domestic conditions that will favor multilateralism. 
There is already government-funded climate change research, but this should be expanded and 
protected because without scientific evidence, it will be impossible to defend against those who 
believe international regulation is unnecessary. Without this evidence, it will also be difficult to 
know which measures will be most effective in alleviating climate change. This information 
should be widely spread throughout the media and in information campaigns, which will help 
garner public support. Finally, although adjusting to regulations may be difficult for American 
companies, it will be much easier for them than for companies in other countries. 
This perspective should be discussed with major companies, and policymakers should listen to 
what the central industry stakeholders would like to see in a climate deal. This will help the 
climate treaty maximize American business interests and win industrial support. Currently, the 
U.S. is in a unique position in which they are simultaneously in the best position from which to 
act on environmental issues and powerful enough to ignore environmental issues entirely and 
suffer few consequences. However, acting now would speed international progress and 
environmental safety while protecting the U.S.  
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Invisible Precedents: The U.S. Drone Strike  




On December 12 2013, the United States launched a drone strike in Yemen, based on the 
claim that the individuals targeted by the strike were terrorists associated with Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The strike resulted in twelve deaths 
and fifteen injuries. After the fact, eyewitnesses revealed that most participants were attending a 
wedding procession and were civilians. Due to conflicting accounts, it is unclear as to whether 
the procession did in fact include terrorists associated with the AQAP (Human Rights Watch 
2014). The legality of this attack, as with all drone attacks, depends on the designation of targets 
as civilians or combatants. The norms of international humanitarian law and the “policy 
requirements on targeted killings that President Barack Obama outlined in May 2013”1 clearly 
indicate that drone attacks on civilians are illegal (Human Rights Watch 2014). Such incidents, 
although not a representation of the drone strike program entirely, raise troubling questions. 
What are the legal precedents that undergird the drone strike campaign? Furthermore, how are 
these legal precedents related to US counterterrorism strategy? Along with the humanitarian and 
ethical concerns regarding the drone strike campaign, there are clear political and legal problems 
at play.   
The drone strike program has been expanded in an unprecedented manner under the 
Obama administration, both legally and in terms of total drone missions. Under the Obama 
administration, drone strikes increased fourfold, followed by a significant legal and bureaucratic 
infrastructure built to sustain the campaign (Masters 2013, 3). This expansion is latent with 
“invisible precedents,” which I define in this paper as implicit norms that are not made apparent 
by existing legal language. Invisible precedents create a precarious environment for 
counterterrorism policy in the long run. Therefore, this article shifts the nexus of focus from a 
mere evaluation of the effectiveness of the drone strike program to an examination of the norms 
undergirding the legality and legitimacy of drone strikes, calling into question the core norms of 
the program. Two central arguments follow this shift in perspective. First, the drone strike 
campaign should be viewed within a larger US counterterrorism policy set up by the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) under the Bush Administration. Second, the 
expansion of the drone campaign is latent with “invisible precedents,” which are disjoint with the 
norms that undergird international humanitarian law.  
1 The policy requirements here refer to the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) which is also 
commonly known as the drone playbook. 
  Page 42 
Swarthmore International Relations Journal Spring 2017
To frame these claims, I will review existing literature on drone strike policy to show how 
current counterterrorism rhetoric fails to accurately address long-term implications of drone 
strikes, such as the possible radicalization of the very groups the strikes seek to hinder. The focus 
on long-term implications of counterterrorism policy will then inform the historical and political 
background behind the expansion the drone program, namely the AUMF and the Bush 
administration’s framing of a borderless War on Terror. Building on this political history, I will 
look at the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) as the culmination of the ambiguous legal 
language that mirrors the legacy set by the AUMF.  
The Existing Literature: Misinformed Counterterrorism Policy 
To understand the problematic nature of the drone strike program, we must first look at 
how the literature on “effectiveness” shapes the language and latent assumptions in U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. The current counterterrorism rhetoric has potential to harm future US 
strategic interests and further the radicalization of the very terrorist groups these policies seek to 
eliminate.  
Most of the literature on the effectiveness of drones focuses on benefits such as fewer 
civilian casualties, elimination of key leaders, and deconstruction of terrorist safe havens (Byman 
2013). Such rationale measures the success of the drone program according to its tactics alone, 
rather than a a broader scale strategy that views counterterrorism strategy in terms of both short 
term and long term goals (Cronin 2013). Furthermore, the rationale for the “effectiveness” of the 
drone campaign fails to consider elements of secrecy and ambiguity of the law. For example, 
civilian casualty counts recorded by the government largely differ from those of independent 
research groups that track public information about drone strikes (Jaffar 2016, 14). This means 
that the apparent “effectiveness” of the current counterterrorism policy is masked by a lack of 
public knowledge and accountability measures. Therefore, although drones can serve U.S. 
interests in the short term, they “may be creating sworn enemies out of a sea of local insurgents” 
in the long term (Cronin 2013).  
Furthermore, the question of effectiveness only applies in the “narrow sense that drone 
strikes sometimes [kill] their targets” (Jaffar 2016, 15). The dichotomous portrayal of the drone 
program in the literature creates a dangerous precedent for meaning and the way in which the 
law is interpreted. In essence, it contributes to an oversimplification of the narrative of 
counterterrorism. Analysis based on effectiveness alone creates policies that  lead to further 
radicalization. For example, the drone strikes conducted in Pakistan have led to the perception of 
indifference for the lives of Muslims and alienation of local populations, all while driving “new 
recruits to the very terrorist and insurgent groups” the United States was trying to initially 
disband (Jaffar 2016, 15). The potential for further radicalization reveals the importance of 
understanding the connection between local responses to drone strikes and US counterterrorism 
policy in the long run. A broader conceptualization of the effects of drone strikes, one that 
considers long term and local effects, is apparently necessary given the dominant discourse and 
literature analyzing their effectiveness.  
In sum, a discourse based in “effectiveness” fails to consider how notions of sovereignty  
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and safety have informed the radicalization of terrorist groups. Drone strikes are received well 
domestically and in the short run; however, in the long-run they set a dangerous precedent in 
terms of international perception while also simultaneously laying ground for unquestioned 
invisible precedents in U.S. counterterrorism policy. A question of “effectiveness” abstracts the 
consequences of drone strikes, one that is mirrored in our legal language. The prevalence of a 
discourse on drone strike “effectiveness,” calls for a shift in perspective, one that considers 
implicit norms that undergird the narrative of US counterterrorism policy. 
 
Theoretical Framework of Analysis  
 In order to avoid the pitfalls of a limited discourse on “effectiveness” while also drawing 
attention to humanitarian concerns, this article takes a constructivist approach to analyzing drone 
strikes. Informed by constructivist traditions in international relations theory, this article views 
language as rule-based and socially defined (Fierke 2013,199). Key in this approach is not only 
viewing language as existing in an either/or subjective or objective realm, but instead viewing 
language put to use by social actors as they construct their world” (Fierke 2013, 197).  This view 
is supplemented by a consideration of the ways in which language and the law can create 
“invisible precedents,” a term I will use in this paper to signify misguided norms underlying 
counterterrorism policy in the long run.  
Furthermore, a constructivist approach complicates the unprecedented expansion of drone 
strike campaigns, as related to the long-term norms that have guided U.S. counterterrorism 
policy from the Bush administration and beyond.  Legal language viewed in a socially 
constructed context takes on a whole different meaning. Counterterrorism policy relies on 
defining terms like “imminent threat,” creating meanings that are subjective and temporally 
bound. In turn, these subjective meanings frame “invisible precedents” set outside of the eye of 
the public, where meaning is identified by a small group of social actors.  
A constructivist approach not only identifies invisible precedents set by legal reasoning 
such as the borderless war rationale for the War on Terror, but it also allows one to see how U.S. 
counterterrorism policy (the action on the part of social agents, interpreting meaning) can 
actually “contribute to the construction of the very problems [policymakers] seek to address” 
(Fierke 2013, 199). One answer to such a problem may be to consider the role of norms in legal 
language, viewed as different experiences of reality, some rooted in observational knowledge 
and others in institutional knowledge (Kratochwil 1989, 21). By understanding that there are 
various realms of possible truths, one could open up the complexity of the problem at hand. 
Embedded in this orientation towards  multiple perspectives is also a question of security 
narratives, and the policies they create in the long run (Krebs 2015, 3).  
There have been few studies on targeted killings from a constructivist perspective. The 
discourse on drones is often reduced to a traditional realist analysis, one concerned with the 
effectiveness of drones alone. The analytical utility of a constructivist approach is situated in not 
only its theoretical novelty, but also its scope of focus. In sum, the constructivist tradition allows 
one to consider the ways in which the U.S. drone strike campaign is situated in a larger 
counterrorism policy framework latent with invisible precedents. 
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Long Term US Counterterrorism Policy: President’s Bush, Obama, and the AUMF 
In this section, I will take a step back from the drone strike program in particular to 
analyze the political and legal landscape that shaped US counterterrorism policy under President 
Obama. The nature of counterterrorism policy in the United States is closely related to the 
invisible precedents set forth from the legal and bureaucratic expansion of the drone strike 
program. 
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States increased the magnitude of 
its counterterrorism policy. The ways in which the U.S. responded to the 9/11 attacks required a 
new language, a language that could encompass a state, the US government, fighting non-state 
actors, such as Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist networks. This shift in national security 
discourse was both quick and unprecedented. The result of this discourse was the AUMF, 
adopted only three days after the attacks occurred. The AUMF stated that the President could use 
“all necessary and appropriate force against all nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11 2001” (Murray 
2015,177). The AUMF provided the Bush administration expansive executive authority allowing 
the Executive Branch to “act contrary to federal statutes… [and] most notoriously to avoid limits 
on interrogations and surveillance” (Johnsen 2016, 4). The most dangerous legacy left by the 
Bush administration’s  
use of the AUMF was the justification for a counterterrorism policy that primarily followed a  
“war-fighting model” (Murray 2015, 175-6). This model went on to be at the core of the legal 
rationale used by the Obama administration to justify the expansion of state-sanctioned targeted 
killing. Both Obama and Bush have used the AUMF to justify controversial legal practices, 
stretching the law “far beyond [its] original congressional intent” (Murray 2015, 175). The 
discourse shift post-911 signaled “terrorism” and “terrorists” as not actors and actions that did 
not exist materially, in an objective manner, but instead they constituted a “radical Other” 
(Buzan and Hansen 2009, 245). The implications of such a discourse carry much further than just 
the realm of security, affecting not only the law, but the legal precedents it obscures.  
Obama inherited a climate from Bush with a suspended notion of the rule of law, one he 
hoped to end with a “recalibration” of the War on Terror (Bergan and Rowland 2013, 7). The 
Obama administration claimed to reject the narrative of the Global War on Terror and instead to 
see counterterrorism policy “as a series of persistent targeted efforts to dismantle specific 
networks of violent extremists” (Jaffar 2016, 37-8). However, his counterterrorism policy in the 
area of drone strikes is a clear example of a policy area in which the Obama administration failed 
to recalibrate the complicated legal precedents set by the Bush administration’s use of the 
AUMF. The AUMF set the precedent for a theory of borderless war, which gave the United 
States government legal rationale to conduct complicated counterterrorism policy in far reaching 
places such as Pakistan and Yemen (Bergan and Rowland 2013). 
The secrecy about counterterrorism policies in both the Bush and Obama administrations 
further complicates the conversation of legality. It seems that the “instinct towards secrecy in the 
national security sphere transcends political parties and administrations… whatever their 
rhetorical commitment to openness” may be (Jaffar 2016, 28). Under the Obama administration,  
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details regarding the drone strike program such as statistics on civilian causalities, identities of 
targets and the legal reasoning developed to undergird the program were kept secret. The 
dimension of secrecy in counterterrorism policy creates the possibility for the language of the 
law to be defined behind closed doors.  Furthermore, the discourse that shaped the drone strike 
campaign fell  under the same legal precedents set by the AUMF. The drone strike program is no 
stranger to the dominant discourse in security narratives. Without considering the precedents 
behind the drone strike program —that is the norms that undergird the counterterrorism program 
as a whole—the United States risks more than just its strategic interests; the drone strike program 
threatens the very stability of international humanitarian law.  
 
Invisible Precedents in Action: The Presidential Guidance (PPG) 
 To exemplify the problematic legal language the drone strike program was justified in, I 
will now look at how the PPG mirrors the language and legal rationale set up by the AUMF. The 
PPG, the most formal legal justification for the drone campaign thus far, is an example of the 
ways in which a misinformed legal rationale can transfer across presidencies, all the while 
contributing to problematic narratives focused on the “effectiveness” of counterterrorism policy 
instead of its long term implications.  
 The PPG is often called the “drone playbook,” and it is seen as the culmination of the 
Obama administration’s attempt to “govern the use of lethal force against suspected terrorists” 
(Jaffar 2016, 21). The document was signed in 2013, but the full (albeit heavily redacted) 
document was only made public in the summer of 2016 due to a federal court order initiated by 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)2. The PPG largely normalized and bureaucratized 
the drone campaign by delineating the ways in which Executive Branch officials decided to use 
lethal force against terrorist targets. The document was seen as attempt to defend both the 
legality and effectiveness of the drone campaign by including more legal rationale rooted in 
human rights principles instead of rules of war (Jaffar 2016, 41-4). However, it instead served to 
“preserve executive discretion” in drone strike policy (Jaffar 2016, 41-4).  
 The language of the PPG fails to clearly delineate a legal and logical rationale for the 
drone strike campaign. For example, it describes future terrorist threats that warrant actions as 
both “imminent” and “continuing” and fails to describe the conditions in which such a threat 
would materialize (Jaffar 2016, 21). The language of that the PPG fails to substantially change 
the paradigms in which we view counterterrorism policy, further situating the drone campaign in 
the complicated “borderless war” rationale set initially by the AUMF and the Bush 
administration.  
 The PPG is a clear example of the danger in leaving unanswered questions, masked in the 
language of the precision of the law. These unanswered questions range anywhere from the 
specific rationale between choosing kill or capture missions to deciding which threats are  
                                                
2 A redacted copy of the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) can be found at the following link: 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/presidential_policy_guidance.pdf. 
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supposedly “imminent”. The PPG may be termed as the President’s “playbook,” but it is a 
playbook without rules, one that leaves too much room for invisible precedents to continue 
taking a dominant place in US security narratives and policy.  
 
Summary 
 The core problem with Obama’s extension of the drone strike campaign is the legal 
dilemma created by circular counterterrorism policy rooted in the theory of borderless war, a 
discourse initially set up by the AUMF post 9/11. The PPG, as well as the drone strike program 
as a whole, create invisible precedents for future counterterrorism policy, as well as a 
complicated domino effect on the growing prevalence of terrorism. Alongside the need for 
decreased secrecy and release of public information, a clear legal rationale that undergirds drone 
strikes as a counterterrorism policy is imperative and necessary.   
The constructivist theoretical tradition invoked in this essay points to the need for a 
paradigm shift in U.S. counterterrorism policy. Counterterrorism policy should focus more on 
long-term implications instead of short term “effectiveness”. Inherent in this paradigm shift is the 
need to re-evaluate the core legal rationale underlying American counterterrorism policy, which 
is that of a borderless war decided by executive powers. Moving towards a policy with “legally 
justified, transparent, and rare” drone strikes is a place to start (Cronin 2013, 7). But to solve the 
core of the problem, there must be a “publically explained legal and moral framework for the use 
of drones, making sure they are a part of a long-term political strategy” (Cronin 2013, 7). Ideally, 
changing the law would also constitute a change in practice as well as a broader consideration of 
the shaky legal basis of post-9/11 counterterrorism policy. However, the invisible legal 
precedents that underlie U.S. security narratives and policy paint a different story. 
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At the opening of the 2015 International Joint Conference of Artificial Intelligence, AI 
scholars presented an open letter, calling for a preemptive ban on autonomous robots that can 
choose and kill targets without human intervention (Future of Life Institute 2015). The letter 
cautions against a “global AI arms race” that will eventually make killing easier for terrorists, 
dictators, and warlords—once autonomous weapons can be mass produced as the technology 
matures. Even though the kind of fully autonomous weapons system described in the letter has 
not been developed yet, the letter warns that the development and deployment of lethal 
autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are possible in the next few years. The letter was signed 
by leading AI researchers such as the CEO of Google DeepMind Demis Hassabis, as well as 
famous academics and technology experts such as physicist Stephen Hawking, CEO of SpaceX 
Elon Musk, Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak, and linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist and 
social critic Noam Chomsky. As of November 2016, the letter has been signed by more than 
20,000 people (Ibid.). 
 Even though many scholars and technology experts have voiced concerns about the 
development and future deployment of LAWS, discussion of a preventative ban in the UN has 
been largely unfruitful (Vilmer 2016). This paper views the inability to reach international 
consensus on a LAWS ban from the perspective of “transnational activists” (Tarrow 2005; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998), and attempts to answer the following two questions. First, what effects on 
domestic policy and international law should activists strive for? Second, what available 
strategies can transnational activists adopt to address the political impasse on the international 
arena? 
 On the first question, this paper argues that activists should push for a “ban + regulation” 
framework that incorporates both a partial ban on LAWS and a set of regulations that mandate 
their responsible use. The necessity and appropriateness of the framework are motivated by 
ethical and legal objections to the use of LAWS without direct human control. On the second 
question, this paper embraces a “two-tier approach” of transnational advocacy that addresses 
various causes of the impasse from both the domestic level and the international level. 
 This paper uses the definition of LAWS proposed by Heather Roff: LAWS are learning 
machines that can autonomously target and fire without human intervention (Roff 2014, 212-
214). Although very broad, a more precise definition is unnecessary. As this paper shall 
demonstrate later, disagreement on the definition of LAWS has been a significant barrier to 
international consensus on the regulation of LAWS, and the international community has come 
to recognize that a comprehensive definition is too early at this point (Vilmer 2016). The 
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definition that this paper adopts should be sufficient for laying out the groundwork of LAWS 
policy discussion. The following sections explore the problems that transnational activists are 
faced with and propose some tentative solutions to the identified problems. 
 
The Problems: The History and Contemporary Politics of LAWS 
The use of military “robots” in warfare traces back to World War I, when the United 
States designed a gyroscope-guided missile called the “Bug,” and Germany designed remote-
controlled motorboats that could be fit with explosives (McCormick 2014). However, military AI 
research really began when the Pentagon gave Massachusetts Institute of Technology significant 
funding in 1963 (Ibid.). Much progress has been made worldwide since. By 2001, the United 
States had fully developed drones that could carry Hellfire missiles (Ibid.). In 2005, due to legal 
and technical concerns, the United States military canceled the plan to build a cruise missile that 
could autonomously kill targets on a battlefield, even though the technology for such a weapon 
had long existed (Gubrud 2015). In 2006, South Korea unveiled sentry robots that could 
automatically track and engage targets, although it was reported that human approval was 
required before the robots could fire (McCormick 2014).  
 During the past several years, artificial intelligence research has achieved results that 
were almost unimaginable in the past. The Economist (2016) reports that, due to the use of new 
techniques such as “deep learning” and “neural networking,” the year 2012 marked the 
beginning of several groundbreaking developments in the field of artificial intelligence. In 2012, 
a research team at the University of Toronto significantly improved the image identification 
ability of previous AI algorithms. Three years later in 2015, an AI algorithm beat the average 
human level of 95% accuracy in image identification for the first time in history. The same 
report also mentioned that in 2016, DeepMind, the AI research branch of Google’s parent 
company Alphabet, made headlines when its AlphaGo system beat Lee Sedol, one of the best 
human players in the world, in the ancient Chinese board game Go (Ibid.). For human players, 
the game of Go, in comparison to chess, is a much more intuitive rather than calculative game. 
Even though chess has already been “solved” in the past by machines using brute force 
algorithms, solving the game of Go was considered “a grand challenge for AI” that would lead to 
significant development of AI technology in many areas of application (Gelly et al. 2012, 107). 
These new techniques of artificial intelligence will most likely find military applications and 
accelerate the development of LAWS. 
 The quick development of AI technology supports the researchers’ conclusion in their 
open letter that “artificial intelligence (AI) technology has reached a point where the deployment 
of such systems is — practically if not legally — feasible within years, not decades” (Future of 
Life Institute 2015). Military AI and the deployment of LAWS will revolutionize robotic 
warfare. In response to this trend, different institutions and organizations have reacted 
differently. For example, the Obama administration issued a guideline on the responsible use of 
autonomous weapons systems (Department of Defense 2012), even though the directive is 
described by one commentator as “unremarkable in substance and arguably should apply to any 
weapons system” (Gubrud 2015). Its definition of LAWS has also been criticized for lack of 
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clarity (Roff, quoted in Conn 2016). UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns submitted a report 
on LAWS to the Human Rights Council in 2013, and the report’s main recommendations 
included national moratoria on the development of LAWS and a panel study of the technology’s 
implications (United Nations Human Rights Council, 21). Since 2014, during the annual UN 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), experts and countries have met and 
discussed disarmament of LAWS (Vilmer 2016). However, very little consensus has been 
reached during the three meetings, due to technical and political reasons (Sayler 2016). First, 
since most of the discussion revolves around whether LAWS should be banned or not, states 
have been cautious with their definitions, and little progress has been made as a result (Ibid.). 
Second, despite a shared understanding that LAWS can be dangerous, many states are still 
unwilling to adopt a binding framework or implement a preventative ban just yet (Vilmer 2016; 
Sayler 2016). 
 
The “Accountability Problem” and the “Strategic Robot Problem” 
Without a robust regulatory framework or a comprehensive ban, the deployment of 
LAWS can significantly challenge the force of international law and undermine the military 
command and control structure. LAWS can cause what can be termed the “accountability 
problem”: assigning blame (legal or moral) is impossible or extremely difficult after an accident 
happens. Unless the artificial intelligence that underlies an autonomous weapons system is 
capable of “higher-order intentionality” about its own beliefs, it usually cannot be morally (or 
legally) responsible for the harm it causes (Dennett 1996, 354). The question, then, is who else 
should be responsible for the harm that LAWS may cause, especially since personal 
accountability is central to international law (Human Rights Watch 2015, 13). 
 Unless a set of procedures is in place that ensures human involvement whenever an 
important tactical or strategic decision is made, meaningful personal accountability is nearly 
impossible. In particular, if human intervention is impossible after LAWS is deployed,1 and the 
system violates the international law by, for example, not respecting the humanitarian law 
requirement of proportionality, either the person(s) who chose to deploy the weapon (the 
commander), or the person(s) who programmed the system (the programmer) should take 
responsibility. Lewis (2015, 1324) concludes that the first option is appropriate based on a 
similar requirement in landmine regulation. However, unless the commander was fully aware 
that the deployment of LAWS will or will likely lead to violation of international law, it seems 
unreasonable that the commander should be blamed for their unpredictability, especially if the 
use of LAWS is permitted by international law. As for landmines, there is already a well-  
                                                
1 Note that even semi-autonomous weapons systems defined in the DOD directive does not 
require human intervention after deployed, and semi-autonomous weapons systems are allowed 
to use lethal force under the current guideline. See Department of Defense, Department of 
Defense Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems (Arlington, VA: United States 
Department of Defense, 2012), 3, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=726163. 
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established norm against their use, and therefore it is appropriate to blame the commander for 
any unjustified harm that his or her deployed landmines cause. 
 The second option also seems inappropriate, since LAWS are unlike other automated 
weapons that “respond to a preprogrammed set of constraints” (Roff 2014, 212). The 
programmer cannot fully control the autonomous learning process of LAWS. The programmer 
need not even be familiar with the international law, just as the developers of AlphaGo did not 
need to know how to play Go (Gibney 2016, 445).2 In conclusion, unless human control is 
present in every step of LAWS operation, assigning criminal responsibility is almost impossible, 
and international humanitarian law violations may not be punishable. 
 Even if the “accountability problem” can be overcome, LAWS that are used without a 
high level of human involvement can still create what Roff calls the “Strategic Robot Problem” 
(Roff 2014). Since the battlefield evolves very rapidly and the list of targets must be constantly 
reviewed and updated by commanders, the deployed LAWS must either possess preprogrammed 
lists of targets, or be “commanders” that can generate their own target lists. In the first case, 
LAWS must frequently be recalled to receive updated lists, undermining the claim that LAWS 
can be cost effective. In the second case, LAWS might generate conflicting military goals with 
each other, and the multiplicity of strategic actors can undermine the command and control 
structure and make interoperability, an important element of modern warfare, “mere fiction” 
(Ibid., 219-220). Moreover, since LAWS operate in isolation and cannot be held morally 
responsible for their decisions, “moral authority and responsibility […] vanishes” (Ibid., 220). 
For those who believe that moral and criminal accountability are normatively indispensable, both 
the “accountability problem” and the “strategic robot problem” weigh heavily against the use of 
LAWS without a high level of human control and a robust command and control structure.3 
 
The Solutions: The “Ban + Regulation” Model 
Many scholars and experts have advocated for a ban on LAWS (Future of Life Institute 
2015). However, as the past three meetings at CCW show, the disagreement over definition and 
the lack of political will to comprehensively ban LAWS have resulted in a gridlock (Vilmer 
2016; Sayler 2016). Arguing that regulation, rather than a ban, is more effective in ensuring 
compliance and protecting human life, John Lewis (2015, 1310) advocates for LAWS regulation 
modeled after that of landmine use. However, dividing the available action space into ban versus 
regulation presents a false dichotomy. This section argues that a “ban + regulation” model is 
more politically practicable and directly deals with the technical problems mentioned in the 
previous section. Roff (2016, 123) also concedes that regulation is important if a ban cannot be 
                                                
2 In the case of AlphaGo, it was a general-purpose algorithm and was not preprogrammed with 
any Go paradigms. 
3 For more discussion on the ethics of LAWS, see Peter Asaro, “On Banning Autonomous 
Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-
Making,” International Review of the Red Cross 94, no. 886 (2012), 687-709,  
doi: 10.1017/S1816383112000768. 
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accomplished, and that we should think about how ban and regulation can together eliminate the 
dangers of LAWS. This section offers some thoughts on this suggestion.  
 First, due to the nature of AI technology, a “comprehensive” ban on LAWS without 
regulatory support is difficult, if not impossible. As Owen (2016) argues, technology such as 
artificial intelligence cannot be “banned” in the usual sense, especially since AI is a “dual-use” 
technology that has already been developed for peaceful use. He argues that procedural 
regulations can be more effective, since it is the individuals who are accountable (Ibid.). 
Moreover, in contrast to its physical manifestations as “devices,” technology is fluid and cannot 
be neatly “boxed in” by a comprehensive ban. For example, Marshall (1997, 1392) observes that 
even though antipersonnel laser weapons that purposefully blind or severely impair soldiers’ 
vision have been banned by international treaty law, many other military devices that use the 
technology but are not explicitly “antipersonnel” are left out from the treaty and can still blind 
soldiers. Examples include “range finders, target illuminators, and anti-sensor systems.” Since it 
is the devices rather than the technology that are prohibited, the “ban” on laser weapons cannot 
completely eliminate the inherent risk of laser technology. 
 Lewis (2015, 1323-1324) argues that LAWS regulations should follow the example of 
those of landmines. In his view, regulations should take into account their technical details and 
capacity, appropriate environment for their deployment, possible evasion techniques and 
mistargeting, level of human control, and other factors. Borrowing from landmine regulations is 
helpful, especially since there is a high level of compliance with landmine regulations among 
signatories (Bryden 2013, cited in Lewis 2015, 1318). On the issue of human control, Roff and 
Moyes (2016) prefer the concept of “meaningful human control” that ensures informed human 
control and possibility for intervention in every step of the process. 
 In addition to a regulatory framework, a partial ban on certain possible kinds of LAWS 
that are clearly dangerous or unacceptable should still be implemented. Lewis (2015) argues 
against banning LAWS, citing again the landmine example where many states were unwilling to 
accept a ban on landmines and instead opted for moderate regulations of the Amended Protocol 
II (1318-1319). However, Article 3 of the Amended Protocol II, in fact, prohibited the use of 
non-detectable landmines, self-deactivating landmines or landmines that are designed to “cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (United Nations 1996, 135-136). Following this 
example, LAWS that cause “unnecessary suffering” as part of their designs should also be 
banned.  
 
A Two-Tier Approach 
How, then, should activists strive to achieve an international regulatory regime based on the “ban 
+ regulation” model? This section of the paper draws from the constructivism literature and 
transnational advocacy network (TAN) literature in IR theory, and argues that activists should 
adopt a more aggressive and creative approach of norm entrepreneurship and international 
contention. 
 As constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt (1992, 397) argues, relationships between 
states are characterized by “intersubjective understandings and expectations” rather than just 
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pure material interests. Kenneth Waltz’s conception of “self-help” (1979), according to Wendt, is 
only one of many different ways the international system could be organized (Wendt 1992, 400). 
Wendt further argues that “positive interdependence of outcome” can create new understandings 
and expectations in the form of social norms, and commitment to these norms can supersede 
egoism in states’ behavior (Ibid., 417). If constructivism correctly describes the ontology of 
international relations, then establishing a norm of LAWS disarmament may prevent a global 
LAWS arms race and lead to more responsible military use of AI technology. 
 Neo-realists who believe world politics is fundamentally a system of self-help, however, 
would criticize this vision as hopelessly utopian. As Waltz (1979, 102-105) argues, the 
international system encourages power-seeking behavior and pursuit of relative gain. Both 
characteristics tend to encourage a global arms race of LAWS, especially since autonomous 
weapons have been regarded as “the third revolution in warfare” (Future of Life Institute 2015). 
Even Wendt does not “contest the neorealist description of the contemporary state system as a 
competitive, self-help world” (1992, 396), and cautions that the transformation of interest and 
identity faces numerous constraints (Ibid., 418). However, the example of nuclear 
nonproliferation shows that pessimism or even fatalism is unwarranted. As Sagan (1996/97, 71-
73, 82-86) observes, domestic actors and constraining international norms can both lead to 
nonproliferation. There is also a strong international norm against the use of nuclear weapons 
(Tannewald 1999, 435). Moreover, between the United States and Russia, significant progress 
has been made in nuclear arms control (Arms Control Association 2014). Thus, self-constraining 
behavior is possible if there is an established norm of disarmament or nonproliferation that stems 
from a shared understanding of the weapon’s danger.  
 Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer’s (2016) report of the third and most recent meeting on 
LAWS at the CCW shows a shared understanding among the states of the potential risk of 
LAWS, but the meeting fell short of building a consensus on its preventative ban. Russia, in 
particular, only wanted a “discussion” on LAWS at this point rather than negotiation of a formal 
framework, and even states that opposed LAWS lacked the political will to advocate for a 
moratorium or preventative ban (Ibid.). In other words, beyond the shared understanding that 
LAWS can be dangerous, states did not feel obligated to agree to a ban. Furthermore, even 
without a ban, there was significant disagreement on what types of regulations should apply 
(Ibid.). For activists who want to create an international norm against the use of LAWS, a two-
tier approach that focuses both on the domestic level and the international level is appropriate. 
 On the domestic level, activists should try to establish a norm against the use of LAWS. 
There have been numerous works published on “norm entrepreneurship” by constructivist and 
transnational advocacy networks (TAN) scholars. Norms are defined as “standard[s] of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity,” such as the norm against the use of 
landmines (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). According to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink (Ibid., 893), “[m]any international norms began as domestic norms and become 
international through the efforts of entrepreneurs of various kinds.” Before norms are 
institutionalized as international rules and organizations, norm entrepreneurs must dramatize or 
even “create” issues by using language that resonates with preexisting moral and cultural 
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 understandings, a process usually referred to as “framing” (Ibid., 897-901; Tarrow 2005, 
61;Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19). Successful framing should depict the issue in unequivocal terms, 
and make experts’ technical information easily digestible for the targeted publics and 
policymakers (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19). Successful framing should also attempt to “graft” the 
new moral standards onto preexisting ones, especially in disarmament politics (Carpenter 2007, 
103-104). Moreover, since a significant role of transnational activism is to provide information 
and argue for a moral position, a useful frame must “show that a given state of affairs is neither 
natural nor accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose credible solutions” 





Figure 1.  A webpage on the website of a campaign against LAWS. Source: Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 
“Learn,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 2015, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org /learn/. 
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Figure 2. A webpage on the the website of a campaign against LAWS. Source: Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 




Figure 3. Using cultural symbols such as the Terminator to illustrate the problem of LAWS. 
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Bearing in mind these lessons, this paper proposes that advocacy campaigns should frame 
the regulation and ban of LAWS in terms of well-known cultural symbols that illustrate the 
familiar fear of technology running amok. One such example is the movie The Terminator, 
where a cyborg killer, the Terminator, is sent back in time to kill all women named “Sarah 
Connor” in a particular area (The Terminator 1984). The website of a current campaign against 
LAWS called “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots” (Figure 1 and Figure 2) displays only dry and 
technical information about LAWS that has little appeal to those unfamiliar with the subject. 
Figure 3 uses the Terminator as a reference point to illustrate the dangers of LAWS. The last 
point of the section “What Similarities Do Killer Robots Share with the Terminator?” alludes to 
an iconic scene in the movie (Ibid.). The “Do you know?” section informs the reader about 
current United States internal policy on LAWS and its inadequacy (Department of Defense 2012, 
3; Gubrud 2015). Using cultural symbols such as the Terminator, activists can frame the issue of 
LAWS not as a technical issue of weapon regulation or moral philosophy, but as an issue of 
unaccountable and unconstrained use of potentially dangerous technology. 
 Reframing the same issue can be effective in several ways. First, there is already a well-
established norm against the use of Terminator-like technology. A senior Department of Defense 
official, for example, emphasized that the autonomous weapons under development are less like 
the Terminator and more like the Iron Man from the eponymous movie (Rosenberg and Markoff 
2016). There is no need to emphasize the dissimilarity between LAWS and the Terminator 
unless a norm against the development of technology similar to the latter already exists. Thus, 
this paper’s proposed frame follows the “grafting” strategy in issue framing (Carpenter 2007, 
104). Second, the proposed frame casts the issue in a morally unambiguous way. It also allows 
the activists to emphasize and illustrate aspects of LAWS that public opinion polls have shown 
to be the most unnerving, such as circumvention of human decision-making and the machines’ 
lack of moral conscience (Carpenter 2014). Third, as Figure 3 illustrates, the use of cultural 
symbols can make technical information memorable and easy to understand. Fourth, just as 
Skynet is “responsible” for the creation of the Terminator, the proposed frame identifies the 
governments as the responsible parties for the issue (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19). Finally, just as 
the movie is about the potential danger of misused technology, the proposed frame emphasizes 
the need for regulation and invites concerned citizens to take action against their states’ 
continued development of LAWS and unwillingness to commit to a regulatory framework.4 
 One objection is that such framing is similar to a scare tactic. Intuition may differ here as 
to whether this is the case. If the goal is to inform the public in a creative and memorable way, 
the use of popular culture references should not be problematic. It is important to note that  
                                                
4 Much of the discussion here is U.S. based, mainly because of the importance of the United 
States in international decision-making, the advanced level of technology development in the 
United States, and the fact that the United States is the only country so far to have a written 
guideline on LAWS. See Vilmer, “Autonomous Weapon Diplomacy.” The same strategy, 
however, applies to all western democracies where there is a cultural norm against similar 
technology. 
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calling LAWS “killer robots” is itself an instance of framing, and public opinion research on 
LAWS shows that the label “killer robots” itself does not make the respondents more opposed to 
LAWS. It is the idea of LAWS that is feared (Carpenter 2013). Framing is primarily a tool of 
persuasion and illustration rather than manipulation. While survey research shows that 
respondents often react unfavorably toward the use of LAWS after the concept is explained 
clearly to them (Ibid.; Open Roboethics Initiative 2015, 5), this framing technique aims to 
increase awareness about this highly technical issue and galvanize the public into action. 
 One may also argue that the proposed strategy is better suited for a campaign that aims 
for a complete ban on LAWS rather than a seemingly more compromised position of “ban + 
regulation,” since the proposed frame seems to appeal primarily to the public’s fear of certain 
technologies. Even if it is the case that the strategy will cause people to push for a complete ban, 
international activists can capitalize on that momentum to advocate stricter sanctions and 
regulations on the use of technology than are otherwise possible, especially when partial bans on 
certain clearly dangerous weapons are met with political resistance from nations. As such, the 
end result would ideally look very similar to what the “ban + regulation” model prescribes. 
On the international level, activists should continue to persuade and offer expertise on the 
subject. Despite the observation that international norms usually begin as domestic norms 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 893), activists need not only focus on the domestic level, 
especially since CCW meetings are open to experts from NGOs, and there is already a common 
understanding among most participants of the third CCW meeting that LAWS can be potentially 
dangerous (Vilmer 2016). The inability to achieve a binding framework or a preventative ban 
reflects not only the lack of political will, but also the genuine technical difficulty of the subject. 
Activists and experts of LAWS can provide information and propose a regulatory framework to 
facilitate the discussion. The following are some suggestions. First, activists should remind 
participant countries that it may still be too early to settle on any particular definition of LAWS, 
and activists should try to push the discussion toward a more constructive direction. Second, 
activists should continue to advocate that LAWS should be subject to “meaningful human 
control,” where human control takes place or is possible before, during, and after LAWS is 
deployed (Roff and Moyes 2016). Activists should emphasize that only humans can and should 
be responsible for the actions of LAWS. Third, activists should highlight certain similarities 
between LAWS and landmines and “frame” certain regulations of LAWS in terms of landmine 
regulations. This can lead to a helpful shift from the unfruitful discussion of whether all LAWS 
should be banned to the identification of the basic elements of a regulatory element. Fourth, 
activists should advocate for some method of inspection and investigation similar to nuclear 
inspection, so that AI experts, human rights and extrajudicial killings experts, and military 
experts can verify that states are not abusing AI technology or violating international law in the 
development of LAWS. Finally, as more information becomes available and the unacceptability 
of particular types of LAWS becomes well understood, activists should advocate for the ban of 
these types of weapons. 
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